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While previous studies have documented children’s consideration of merit in fairness 
decisions, less is known about specifically how merit has been conceptualized by children, as 
effort and outcome were confounded in merit (Baumard et al., 2012; Kienbaum & Wilkening, 
2009). Thus, the current study aimed to disentangle these two components of merit in 
understanding children’s conceptions of fairness.  
 One hundred children (3 to 6 year-olds and 7 to 10 year-olds) participated in this 
study. Children’s understanding of merit was documented in four contexts: a) when effort and 
outcome were confounded (baseline), b) when outcome was controlled (i.e., when the level of 
effort was varied), c) when effort was controlled (i.e., when the level of outcome was varied), 
and d) when given the opportunity to prioritize either effort or outcome. 
Novel findings were that with increasing age, children prioritized effort over outcome 
and thus found it to be fair when more resources were allocated to the hardworking peer than 
to the productive peer. That is, older children were more likely to focus on the positive 
intentions of an act rather than positive consequences compared to younger children. In 
addition, when merit was examined when effort and outcome was controlled, children were 
still able to take into consideration for merit, thereby allocating more resources to a peer who 
was hardworking over a peer who was lazy (when outcome was the same) and to a peer who 
was productive over a peer who was unproductive (when effort was the same).  
  
                   
 
   Interesting findings were revealed when authority figures’ messages were present: 
all-aged children rejected a teacher’s allocation decision that was against merit; however, 
older children rejected a teacher’s equal allocation decision while younger children found a 
teacher’s equal allocation to be okay. The current study made a significant contribution to the 
current literature by examining the process in which children integrate two different aspects 
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Introduction and Study Rationale 
 From an early age, children make decisions that reflect concerns about others’ 
welfare (Jambon & Smetana, 2014; Killen & Rutland, 2011; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
2009). Children gradually learn how people should treat one another from their everyday 
social interactions, and these lessons make up an essential component of morality (Smetana, 
Jambon, & Ball, 2014). The treatment of others involves important moral issues such as how 
and whether to fairly distribute a limited number of resources and to deny monopolization of 
resources (Turiel, 1983). To fully investigate this issue, it is important to examine how 
children’s sense of distributive justice (i.e., allocation of limited resources) develops with 
age. 
There is a long history of research regarding children’s distributive justice. For 
example, Piaget (1932) and Damon (1977) have demonstrated that children’s concept of 
fairness matures with age in their resource allocation decisions. Both theorists argued that 
children mature from focusing on strict equality (dividing resources equally regardless of the 
situation) or self-interest (giving more to themselves) to considering more cognitively 
complex principles of justice, such as recipients’ need and merit.  
Along with theoretical propositions, empirical research also has provided evidence 
that children develop their conception of fairness with regard to resource allocation as they 
mature. For instance, young children strongly advocate strict equality at an early age (e.g., 3 
to 4 years) and judge that equal allocations are fair in most contexts (Damon 1977; Olson & 
Spelke, 2008; Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011). However, with age, children 
gradually understand that unequal allocations are necessary to ensure fairness in some 
situations by developing “equity-based concerns”, such as merit, need, and pre-existing 
inequalities (Rizzo & Killen, 2016). Thus, with age, children are more likely to deviate from 
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equality in their giving by distributing more resources to someone who deserves more 
resources, derived from concerns on merit (Kienbaum & Wilkening, 2009), to someone who 
needs more resources (Kenward & Dahl, 2011; Li, Spitzer, & Olson, 2014; Sigelman & 
Waitzman, 1991), or to someone who has limited access to resources (Rizzo & Killen, 2016).  
Among these equity-based concerns, the current study aimed to focus on how children 
with age increasingly incorporate merit in their fair distribution decisions. As merit reflects 
deservingness based on an individual’s contribution, the construct of merit includes the 
components of effort (i.e., how hard someone works) and outcome (i.e., the results that 
someone produces) (Carson & Banuazizi, 2008; Kienbaum & Wilkening, 2009). Numerous 
studies have demonstrated that children increasingly incorporate merit as they age (Rizzo et 
al., 2016; Schmidt et al., 2016). That is, while studies on young children have some mixed 
findings on to what extent children understand merit, children aged 7 to 8 year-olds or more 
are found to demonstrate that merit is a legitimate reason to deviate from equal distribution 
across contexts (Baumard et al., 2012; Schmidt, Svetlova, Johe, and Tomasello, 2016). 
While extensive research has focused on children’s understanding of merit in resource 
allocation, what remains to be investigated is whether children place more value on the 
“effort” or the “outcome” aspects of merit in their distributive fairness decisions. Most, if not 
all, previous empirical studies have examined situations where meritorious recipients were 
described to be “hardworking and productive” (Baumard et al., 2012; Rizzo, Elenbaas, 
Cooley, and Killen, 2016). These two variables are confounded, to some extent, because 
individuals could work hard and not produce much, or not work hard and produce a lot. It is 
important to disentanlge effort and outcome in this context because if these two are conflated, 
then individuals might mistakenly assume high effort based solely on an observation of the 
outcome; or conversely, individuals may mistakenly assume low effort based solely on an 
observation of low outcome. This is problematic because “working hard” involves positive 
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intrinsic aspect of an act whereas “being productive” reflects a result of efficiency or 
accomplishing a job, which could happen as a result of luck or other external factors. Thus, 
effort and outcome are two distinctive factors which need to be investigated respectively, and 
this documentation would help us better understand how childen come to reach a moral 
decision that ensures fairness for everyone.  
To fill in this knowledge gap, this study investigated children’s understanding of 
merit in resource allocation context when: 1) effort and outcome were confounded (i.e., one 
worked hard and produced more vs. one did not work hard and produced less); 2) outcome 
was controlled (i.e., one worked hard vs. one did not work hard, while outcomes were the 
same); 3) effort was controlled (i.e., one produced more vs. one produced less, while efforts 
were the same); and 4) there was a tension between effort and outcome (i.e., one worked hard 
but produced less vs. one did not work hard but produced more). From in-depth investigation 
of these contexts, this study aimed to shed light on what lied beneath children’s full 
understanding of merit and how children’s conceptions of morality in distributive justice 
changed with age.  
Parameters of Interest  
 Effort. When children are asked to distribute a limited number of resources, with age 
children increasingly allocate more resources to a hardworking person who also produced 
more (Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012; Liénard, Chevallier, Mascaro, Kiura, & Baumard, 
2013; Melis, Altrichter, and Tomasello, 2013; Rizzo, Elenbaas, Cooley, and Killen, 2016). 
This indicates that children’s conceptions of fairness regarding merit – when effort and 
outcome are confounded in merit – develop with age. However, while this can mean that 
children consider effort as an important criterion for fairness decisions, it is not certain 
whether the findings are driven by effort, and not from outcome. In fact, a great deal of 
research also have demonstrated that it was not until middle to late childhood that children 
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put a stong emphasis on intentions rather than consequences (Helwig, Zelazo, and Wilson, 
2001). In particular, a study by Kienbaum and Wilkening (2009) revealed that in morally 
complex siutations where recipients’ effort and need statues were varied, younger children 
ages 6 years focused more on the need status rather than one’s effort when making allocation 
decisions, while older children considered both effort and need as important allocation 
principles. Such findings raises the question of whether children display different judgment 
regarding meritorious recipients when the effort is the sole concern for children’s allocation 
decisions. Thus, children’s resource allocation when effort is the only factor that varies 
between the recipients, by controlling for the outcomes of the two recipients (i.e., 
productivity) should be investigated further. 
 Outcome. Children also take outcome (e.g., productivity) into consideration in their 
resource allocation decisions (Rizzo, Elenbaas, Cooley, and Killen, 2016; Schmidt, Svetlova, 
Johe, and Tomasello, 2016). Because prior studies have only examined situations where 
productivity is the result of effort, they also do not address the question of whether children’s 
consideration of outcome itself – when disentangled from effort – is still prevalent. A long 
history of research in developmental science dating back to Piaget (1932) has demonstrated 
that children first focus on the consequences of a given situation and then gradually take 
other factors (such as intentions) into consideration as their moral thinking matures. For 
instance, when negative consequences occur due to unintentional moral transgressions, it has 
been found that children under 6 years of age were more likely to judge it as unacceptable 
compared to older children. This is due to the fact that older children are better able to 
incorporate intentions into their judgments of a behavior and its consequences (Imamog˘lu, 
1975; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996; Piaget, 1932). This raises the question of whether 
children regard outcome, controlled for effort, as an important allocation principle and how 
this differs with age.  
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Disentangling Effort and Outcome. Not only controlling for effort and outcome in 
merit is important in understanding children’s fairness decisions, but it is also critical to 
examine situations where there is a tension between effort and outcome. That is, what if one 
person works hard but does not produce a lot, whereas another person produces a lot although 
he or she was lazy? It is an important question of which aspect – intention or consequence – 
of the work children would give more credit to and incorporate it into their fairness decisions. 
In order to examine this, two individuals where one has a high level of effort (and a low level 
of outcome) and another has a high level of outcome (and a low level of effort) should be 
compared as potential recipients. This area of research is warranted given that prior studies 
confounding effort and outcome did not reflect the real world; our everyday lives provide 
many instances of contrast between effort and outcome, with hard work garnering little, and 
scarce effort being richly rewarded. Examples of individuals succeeding with minimal effort 
and blind luck, while others work long hours and receive little to no recognition, are 
commonplace in society and tend to illicit strong reactions in adults. Therefore, an 
examination of children’s judgments of resource allocation when there is a tension between 
effort and outcome is a meaningful extension of the previous literature concerning children’s 
fairness conceptions. This will allow us to examine whether children prefer one factor over 
the other in their fairness decisions when effort and outcome were both salient, and further 
how this pattern develops with age. 
 Children’s view on authority figures’ allocation decisions. In addition to 
documenting children’s own resource allocation decisions, examining children’s evaluations 
of others’ – especially authority figures – allocation decisions is another way to capture 
children’s conceptions of fairness. Surprisingly, no studies have systematically investigated 
children’s expectation on authorities’ use of moral principles. What if an authority holds a 
view that is against children’s own, such as giving resources to someone that they think does 
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not deserve? Will children respect the decision or have a say against it? Thus, there is a need 
to document children’s evaluations and reasoning when a teacher makes allocation decision 
on equality (e.g., giving everyone the same amount, by disregarding merit) or allocation 
decisions against merit (e.g., giving more to the less hardworking peer and/or unproductive 
peer). This would allow us to examine how and whether children’s resource distribution will 
be reconciled when children face authority figure’s allocation decisions that does not reflect 
merit. If children had a solid understanding of merit, they would reject an allocation decision 
which does not reflect fairness distribution even if it came from an authority figure.  
Theoretical Overview: Social Domain Theory  
 The study was informed by the Social Domain Theory (SDT) (Turiel, 1983; 1998), 
which enabled us to examine children’s moral judgments and reasoning on merit-based 
resource allocation when effort and outcome were varied. The Social Domain Theory (Nucci, 
1981; Turiel, 1983) posits three central domains of social knowledge: moral domain, societal 
domain, and psychological domain. The moral domain includes issues pertaining to justice, 
fairness, and rights; the societal domain includes issues pertaining to conventional rules and 
norms; and the psychological domain includes issues pertaining to personal choices and 
preferences. The SDT assumes that it is possible even for young children to reason about 
fairness, justice, and rights in the moral domain and thus, judge a transgression to be right or 
wrong. It has been found that children as young as 3 years of age distinguish moral and 
conventional events, and thus have the ability to apply moral criteria to moral events 
(Smetana, 2006; Smetana, Rote et al., 2012). Although extensive research has investigated 
prototypic moral transgressions (e.g., hitting and stealing) from the SDT perspective (Turiel, 
2008), very few studies have used this theoretical framework to examine concerns for 
fairness. To fill in this gap, the current study aimed to use the SDT to examine children’s 
decisions on dividing a limited number of resources in a fair way.  
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 The Social Domain theory also puts a strong emphasis on the documentation of 
children’s responses in different dimensions, including children’s judgments, behaviors, and 
reasoning (Killen & Rutland, 2011; Turiel, 2008). SDT shows that different dimensions of 
children’s responses altogether highlight children’s developing moral concerns. Thus, in the 
current study, children were assessed in their own resource allocation decisions, evaluation of 
others’ allocation decisions, along with the reasoning which includes children’s underlying 
motivations that guide their judgments. 
 In addition, the Social Domain theoretical framework highlights the importance of 
the authority-independent features of moral judgments. A plethora of empirical studies have 
revealed that young children have the ability to make moral decisions on their own, apart 
from the influence of authority figures (Damon, 1977; McGillicuddy-De Lisi, Daly, & Neal, 
2006; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). For instance, children as young as 3 years of age viewed 
moral transgressions such as hitting and teasing to be harmful and unacceptable, even when 
there were no rules or authority commands that prohibit the act (Smetana, Schlagman, & 
Adams, 2003). Further, children even believe that it was unacceptable for authority figures to 
find moral transgressions permissible and raising concerns regarding fair treatment and 
welfare of others (Wainryb, Shaw, Langley, Cottan, & Lewis, 2004). Although the authority-
independent features have been extensively demonstrated in prototypic transgressional 
situations, such as physical harm (e.g., children still believe it is wrong to hit others even 
when authority approve the act of hitting others) (Laupa, & Tse, 2005; Laupa, Turiel, & 
Cowan, 1995), almost no studies have looked into this in the context of resource allocation 
decisions. Thus, this study examined the authority-independent feature in resource allocation 
context, extending the studies using Social Domain framework.   
Overview of the Current Study 
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 Children’s full understanding of merit is in their distributive decisions is directly 
related to the issues of one’s welfare and rights. The general goal of the current study was to 
examine how children evaluated two factors of merit - effort and outcome - in their fairness 
decisions and how it changed with age. Thereby, the focus of this study was on how children 
internally negotiated and reasoned about whether an intentional aspect of the work deserved 
more or a consequential aspect of the work deserved more in a resource allocation setting. 
That is, when children reason about what makes an individual deserving of something, did 
they focus on the intrinsic motivation of the work or the consequences of the work?  
To answer these questions, children were asked to make judgments in several 
situations which led them to weigh effort and outcome. These situations were: a) children’s 
own resource allocation (in which children distributed resources in a way they think is fair 
when potential recipients differed in terms of effort and outcome); b) children’s peer 
preference (in which children chose a peer that they would like to work with for a future task, 
when the peers differed in terms of effort and outcome); and c) children’s evaluations of 
teachers’ allocation (in which children evaluated an authority figure’s allocation decisions 
which did not take merit into account or which sided only with either effort over outcome).  
In this study, resource allocation framework was used; that is, children were given 
tangible resources (e.g., star stickers) to give out to potential recipients. The resources were 
designed to be desirable items for children. However, it is noteworthy that resources used in 
this study were different from rewards. Unlike rewards which are used to encourage or 
motivate someone’s act, the goal of the resource here was not to incentivize a well-done act. 
The resources were used in this study only to provide children with an opportunity to think 
about what values they should integrate in order to reach a fair distribution decision. Thus, 
inviting children to allocate resources to potential recipients was one of the many ways to 
measure children’s conceptions of fairness. In particular, the fundamental question that this 
- 9 - 
 
 
study aimed to answer is how children conceptualize merit (i.e., who deserves more 
resources) when making fairness decisions.  
In terms of participants’ age, two age groups of 3 to 6-year-olds and 7 to 10-year-
olds were compared in order to capture developmental differences in their evaluation of merit 
in their fairness decisions. These two groups were selected based on the previous research: 
prior studies on children’s emerging understanding of merit showed that 3 to 6-year-olds had 
somewhat limited ability to fully consider merit in their fairness decisions, while children 
above 7 years of age had concrete conceptions of merit (Melis, Altrichter, & Tomasello, 
2013; Sigelman and Waitzman, 1991; Smith & Warneken, 2016).  
Specific Aims 
 In everyday life, children’s concepts of fairness and justice develop as they start to 
coordinate multiple factors into their allocation judgments (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Killen, 
Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013; Li, Spitzer, & Olson, 2014). It has been shown that children 
specifically acknowledge who works hard and who contributes more to a given task, and use 
such knowledge to decide who deserves more in their allocation judgments (Rizzo, Elenbaas, 
Cooley, & Killen, 2016). However, what remains unknown is how children evaluate effort 
when controlled for outcome and outcome when controlled for effort, and further how they 
take fairness into consideration when there is a tension between effort and outcome. 
Aim 1: How children integrate effort and outcome in their allocation decisions. 
The first aim of this study was to determine how children evaluate “effort” and “outcome” – 
the two components of merit - in their allocation decisions. It has been shown that when 
effort and outcome are confounded in merit, children increasingly incorporate merit in their 
fairness allocation decisions (Liénard, Chevallier, Mascaro, Kiura, & Baumard, 2013; Melis, 
Altrichter, and Tomasello, 2013; Sigelman and Waitzman, 1991). However, what still needs 
to be investigated is whether children integrate merit to their fairness decisions when 
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outcome is controlled, and when effort is controlled. Further, when children are given the 
opportunity to prioritize effort or outcome, little is known which factor children would regard 
as more deserving of resources. 
Aim 2: How children use information on effort and outcome to make peer 
preference choices. The next aim of this study was to examine how children evaluate effort 
and outcome when they make peer preference judgments. That is, it is not known how 
children use information on effort and outcome when they decide whom they would like to 
collaborate with on a hypothetical group work. This context also needs to be investigated by 
fully disentangling effort and outcome; thus, children’s peer preference would be examined 
when effort and outcome are confounded, when outcome is controlled, and when effort is 
controlled. In addition, when one peer displays effort while the other peer displays high 
outcome, children’s preference for either effort-peer or outcome-peer needs to be examined 
to document which factor children value more in making peer selection for collaboration 
work.  
Aim 3: How children evaluate authority figures’ allocations. The third aim of this 
study was to examine whether children’s conceptions of fairness regarding merit are 
independent from authority figures’ input. Although prior work have shown that children 
tend to reject authority’s moral judgments that contrast to their own moral values (Laupa, 
1996), these studies were limited to physical or psychological harm, thereby leaving room for 
investigation on children’s distributive justice. Thus, this study tested whether children would 
reject or abide by teachers’ allocation decisions that were based on strict equality (i.e., giving 
equal resources to two individuals, disregarding different levels of merit) or teachers’ 
allocation decisions that were based against merit (i.e., giving resources in direct contrast to 
merit). This would enable us to examine whether children accept authorities’ opinions due to 
their high age status, or whether children advocate meritorious allocation regardless.  
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Further, this study examined how children would respond to authority’s allocation 
decision advocating either effort or outcome when there was a tension between these two 
factors. That is, children how would evaluate authority figures’ allocation decisions based on 
effort over outcome (i.e., giving more resources to a hardworking individual over a 
productive individual) and outcome over effort (i.e., giving more resources to a productive 
individual over a hardworking individual) would be examined.  
Hypotheses  
 The current section provides specific hypotheses that correspond with the aims of the 
current study described above.  
 Children’s understanding of merit: when effort and outcome are confounded 
(baseline). Will children regard merit as an important factor to deviate from equality when 
effort and outcome are confounded in merit? In order to examine this question, children were 
first given the opportunity to distribute a limited number of resources to two peers: one peer 
with high effort and high outcome (meritorious peer) and another peer with low effort and 
low outcome (non-meritorious peer). It was predicted that children would allocate more 
resources to a meritorious peer, thereby considering greater effort and outcome as an 
important factor to deviate from equality, as found in previous studies on children’s 
understanding of merit (Rizzo, Elenbaas, Cooley, & Killen, 2016; Sigelman and Waitzman, 
1991). As children’s moral thinking develops, it was expected that older children would make 
meritorious allocation decisions and also refer to the importance of effort in their 
justifications, more so than younger children. Similarly, when children were asked to choose 
a peer to collaborate with for a hypothetical future task, children were expected to choose to 
work with the meritorious peer who displayed greater effort and outcome (over the peer who 
displayed less effort and outcome) and this tendency was expected to increase with age. 
Lastly, when children were faced with an authority’s non-meritorious decision, it was 
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predicted that with age, children would increasingly reject authority figures’ allocations that 
did not consider merit into account (e.g., allocations based on strict equality and allocations 
against merit). This was expected based on prior research that as children reject adults’ 
immoral judgments and regard them to be unfair and unacceptable (Laupa et al., 2005).  
Children’s understanding of merit: controlling for outcome. The next question is, 
how would children evaluate merit when outcome is controlled? That is, will children regard 
merit as an important factor to deviate from equality when only effort explains merit? In order 
to examine this question, children were given the opportunity to distribute a limited number 
of resources to two peers: one peer with high effort (meritorious peer) and another peer with 
low effort (non-meritorious peer), while both peers had the same low outcome. It was 
hypothesized that children would allocate more resources to a meritorious peer who was 
hardworking than to a non-meritorious peer who was lazy, when both grew small number of 
flowers. As children in middle childhood view effort as a more important basis of 
deservingness compared to younger children (Kienbaum and Wilkening, 2009; Sigelman and 
Waitzman, 1991), it was expected that, when outcome is controlled, with age children would 
increasingly make meritorious allocation decisions based on effort; focus on the importance 
of effort in their justifications; prefer to work with the peer who displayed greater effort (over 
the peer who displayed less effort); and reject an authority’s non-meritorious allocation 
decision.  
Children’s understanding of merit: controlling for effort. Similarly, would 
children regard merit as an important factor to deviate from equality when effort is 
controlled? That is, will children regard merit as an important factor to deviate from equality 
when only outcome explains merit? In order to examine this question, children were given the 
opportunity to distribute a limited number of resources to two peers: one peer with high 
outcome (meritorious peer) and another peer with low outcome (non-meritorious peer), while 
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both peers had the same low effort. It was hypothesized that children would allocate more 
resources to a meritorious peer with greater outcome (i.e., productive) than to a peer with less 
outcome, when both peers were lazy. Based on prior research showed that younger children 
make judgments based on consequences more so than older children due to their limited 
ability to understand the intentions of an act (Feinfield, Lee, Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1999; 
Helwig, et al., 2001; Powell, Derbyshire, & Guttentag., 2012), it was expected that with age 
children would be less likely to make meritorious allocation decisions based on outcome and 
less likely to prefer to work with the peer who displayed greater outcome (over the peer who 
displayed less outcome). In children’s justifications, it was predicted that older children 
would focus more on effort, while younger children would focus more on outcome. In 
addition, it was expected that older children would be less likely to reject an authority’s non-
meritorious allocation decision (i.e., giving more to the peer with less outcome, when the 
effort was same for both peers). These set of hypotheses were driven from the previous 
theories and literature suggesting that young children’s such a strong emphasis on 
consequences (Helwig et al., 2001; Piaget, 1932). 
Children’s understanding of merit: giving priority to effort or to outcome. When 
there was a tension between effort and outcome (i.e., one peer with greater effort and less 
outcome vs. another peer with less effort and greater outcome), which factor – effort or 
outcome – would children prioritize more in their fairness decisions? Overall, it was expected 
that while older children would prioritize effort over outcome and thus allocate more 
resources to the peer who displayed greater effort (and less outcome) than to the peer who 
displayed greater outcome (and less effort), younger children would show the opposite 
pattern, thereby allocating more resources to the peer who displayed greater outcome (and 
less effort) than to the peer who displayed greater effort (and less outcome),. This was based 
on the prior work that children under 7 years of age have been shown to judge intention based 
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on outcome, thereby prioritizing outcome over intention in their judgments (Feinfield, Lee, 
Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1999; Montgomery & Montgomery, 1999; Schult, 2002; Shultz & 
Wells, 1985). Because children gain the increasing ability to incorporate intentions in their 
moral judgments as their moral thinking becomes more sophisticated (Noh, Jambon, 
Smetana, Lee, and Killen, 2017; Sigelman and Waitzman, 1991), it was expected that older 
children would be more likely to make meritorious allocation decisions prioritizing effort 
over outcome; focus on the importance of effort over outcome in their justifications; and 
prefer to work with the peer who displayed greater effort (over the peer who displayed 
greater outcome). In addition, when children were faced with an authority’s decision that 
sided with effort over outcome, it was hypothesized that older children would be more likely 
to find it as acceptable compared to younger children. On the other hand, when faced with an 
authority figure’s allocation decision prioritizing outcome over effort, the opposite age 
pattern was predicted. 
Study Impact and Contributions  
 Overall, findings from the current study provided valuable foundational knowledge 
regarding how children conceptualize the moral principles of fairness based on merit. This 
study particularly defined the different components of merit and aimed to examine how effort 
and outcome respectively influenced children’s fairness decisions, and further identify which 
factor – effort or outcome – was prioritized in children’s moral judgments. Documenting 
children’s developing trajectory in understanding merit would provide important information 
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From everyday interactions, children reflect, abstract, and evaluate social exchanges 
and events that contribute to their general understanding of how individuals ought to act 
towards others (Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2014). These obligatory expectations about inter-
individual treatment make up an essential component of morality. Understanding its origins 
and development contribute to the goal of investigating and documenting moral development 
(Damon, 1977; Piaget, 1932; Turiel, 1983, 1998).  
Research on moral development has revealed that children care about others’ welfare 
from an early age (Jambon & Smetana, 2014; Killen & Rutland, 2011; Vaish, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2009). Over the past decade, a plethora of research has emphasized children’s 
developing moral concerns regarding physical harm (e.g., hitting) and psychological harm 
(e.g., calling names) (Killen & Smetana, 2015; Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2014; Turiel, 
1983). These lines of work have documented that children as young as 3 years of age judge 
that it is wrong to inflict harm to others because of negative consequences it brings to others 
(Smetana, Rote, Jambon, Tasopoulos‐Chan, Villalobos, & Comer, 2012). 
In understanding children’s moral concern for others’ welfare, a central moral issue is 
the fair distribution of resources. A resource allocation research framework has been widely 
applied to investigate moral decisions pertaining to distributive justice, an essential 
component of children’s moral development (Kienbaum & Wilkening, 2009; Melis, 
Altrichter, & Tomasello, 2012; Rizzo, Elenbaas, Cooley, & Killen, 2016; Schmidt, Svetlova, 
Johe, & Tomasello, 2016; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). That is, the way resources are 
allocated to individuals is relevant to the issue of inflicting harm on others since unfair 
resource allocation is a form of unfair treatment. Children start to recognize the wrongfulness 
of the denial of resources to others from a young age (Rizzo & Killen, 2016; Smetana, 
Jambon, & Ball, 2014; Turiel, 1983). Given that unfair allocation of resources becomes the 
most frequent source of conflict in early childhood, investigations about resource allocation 
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are fundamental. Thus, children’s judgments about distributive justice — decisions on how to 
fairly allocate resources among individuals — and its relationship to how children’s moral 
concerns for others develop with age should be fully examined. 
Several moral bases for ensuring the fair treatment of others have been investigated 
thus far (Killen, Elenbaas, & Rutland, 2016). Some of the examples are equality (dividing up 
resources equally; “3 candies for X and 3 candies for Y”), need (dividing up resources to 
those who needs more; “she is poor and has few resources; he is wealthy and has lots of 
resources.”), and merit (dividing up resources by taking into account deservingness; “he 
worked hard, and she was lazy.”). Such bases of fairness stem from moral philosophy and 
have been adapted by developmental psychologists to study the reasons children use to make 
allocation decisions.  
Among these factors, recently merit has received much attention in studying resource 
allocation. However, the category of merit is complex and can include diverse aspects of 
deservingness. The term “Merit” reflects allocating resources according to deservingness, 
primarily based on how much an individual contributed to the task, such as effort (Carson & 
Banuazizi, 2008; Kienbaum & Wilkening, 2009). For example, when children are asked to 
give out a limited number of resources (e.g., stickers and cookies) to recipients, they 
prioritize those who have worked harder to earn good outcome, and judge that allocating 
more resources to the meritorious recipient is fair and just (Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevallier, 
2012; Schmidt, Svetlovab, Joheb, & Tomasello, 2016). However, often times merit can 
include other factors than effort, such as production. For example, children may think it is fair 
to give more to the recipient who have a greater outcome although less effort was put into, 
focusing more on the product than effort in measuring deservingness. Thus, one main goal of 
the current review will be to examine how “merit” has been conceptualized by children, and 
how it has been measured in resource allocation studies with young children. A full 
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investigation on children’s understanding of merit will provide a sound basis for future 
studies in this area of research.  
In addition to children’s own fairness decisions based on merit, this literature review 
will examine children’s views about authority’s fair distributions. Although extensive 
research has investigated children’s conceptions of authority and authority jurisdiction in 
moral contexts (Laupa, 1995; Laupa, & Tse, 2005), little research has examined this factor in 
resource allocation context. For instance, how do children conceptualize what principles 
authorities (e.g., parents, teachers, community leaders) rely on when allocating resources? In 
instances where authorities do not make fair distribution decisions, will children challenge 
against authority or agree with them? To examine children’s full understanding of merit, it is 
important to document how and whether children reconcile their fairness judgments when 
they face authority’s unfair (e.g., non-meritorious) allocation decisions. Although very few 
studies have been conducted in these areas, these concerns will be examined in a resource 
allocation context in this literature review. 
The goal of this literature review is to examine research on children’s moral 
judgments regarding the fair allocation of resources with a particular focus on merit, and on 
children’s views about the use of moral principles by authority figures. Thus, this review will 
be organized in four sections: 1) exploring the theoretical background of children’s 
conceptions of fairness; 2) reviewing empirical studies on children’s developing moral 
principles of fairness in the resource allocation context, with a focus on merit; 3) examining 
children’s views about authority fairness distributions in resource allocation contexts, and 4) 
offering further directions for the current study.  
Theoretical Background of Children’s Developing Concerns for Fairness  
Piaget’s Theory of Moral Development in Childhood  
      Piaget’s (1932) foundational research set the stage for an entire field of research on 
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the origins of morality in childhood. In his book The Moral Judgment of the Child 
(1932/1965), Piaget reported on a vast number of empirical studies involving observations of 
and interviews with children designed to determine how they developed an understanding of 
moral judgment. He collected responses to vignettes covering a diverse range of moral 
dilemmas, including division of resources, fairness in punishment, and intentional and 
unintentional transgressions. Upon examining the reasoning underlying children’s decisions 
and investigating how children from diverse age groups reason differently about fairness, 
Piaget postulated that children experience two phases in understanding distributive justice, 
largely framed as heteronomous and autonomous period.  
Piaget stated that children before 7 to 8 years of age are in the heteronomous period, 
when they view fairness as resulting from authority mandates rather than from children’s 
construction of moral principles and rules. Rather than thinking about what is the just way to 
distribute resources themselves, children in this period tend to follow moral rules given by 
the authorities. Nevertheless, if the adults fail to consistently carry out the rules they set for 
children, children consider treatment as unfair and unjust. However, if adults reliably stick to 
a certain set of rules, it is this set of rule that is understood to be just and fair by children in 
this age.  
By the time children reach 11 to 12 years of age, Piaget speculated that children 
become more autonomous, wherein the conceptions of fairness stem from their own concept 
of distributive justice. Children in this period no longer abide authority’s precedence over 
justice and understand that authority cannot be the source of justice. Piaget asserted that 
adults are still influential in children’s development of fairness conceptions, but that authority 
itself is not a sufficient source of justice. Further, children at this age claimed to develop 
equalitarianism in the direction of relativity. That is, children take into account a variety of 
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factors, such as individual circumstances and situations (e.g., “He is bigger so he may need 
more cookies than the smaller person”).  
In addition to differentiating the heteronomous and autonomous periods, Piaget also 
theorized how the development of moral concepts developed from a less advanced to a more 
advanced phase. In other words, Piaget emphasized that children’s social interactions with 
other people, especially their peer interactions (e.g., sharing resources like toys) are what 
drive children to move to a more advanced understanding of fairness and distributive justice, 
more so than one-way instruction from an adult. He further asserted that children are not 
passive recipients of moral knowledge, but rather take an active role in constructing moral 
principles of justice. 
Damon’s Approach to Children’s Moral Judgments and Reasoning 
Following Piaget’s (1932) classic work, Damon (1977) proposed developmental 
changes regarding children’s distributive reasoning. Similar to Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg 
(1969), Damon conducted extensive interviews with children 4–10 years of age. Specifically, 
he posed dilemmas in which limited resources had to be allocated among several people who 
differed in terms of factors such as need and merit, and found that children progress through 
6 developmental levels. The primitive level is 0-A, in which children make distributive 
decisions based on self-interest: “I should have more because I want it more.” Children at this 
level assert choices rather than trying to justify them. Children in the next level, 0-B, are 
similar in that they use self-interest as the decision benchmark; however, they justify their 
decisions based on external factors, including physical characteristics such as sex and race: 
“We should get more because we are boys”. Children at both of these levels fail to consider 
what is fair and right for others. 
In the next level, 1-A, at about the age of 5, children start to develop a notion of strict 
equality, believing that the only fair way to treat everyone is to divide resources equally. The 
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next level emerges at age 6 or 7 (Level 1-B), with children now developing a better 
understanding of merit, in that they link fairness to how much someone deserves something. 
Children in this level believe that one should receive resources to the degree that one worked 
hard or did something good.  
A better understanding of distributive justice forms at the next level (2-A) in which 
children of around 7 or 8 learn that different individuals can have different and competing, 
yet equally valid, justifications for their claims. However, consideration of “one’s needs” in 
distributing fairly becomes more salient for children in this level. They often confuse fairness 
with compromise and believe that poor people should receive more to compensate, thus 
entering a benevolent mode of behavior. In the final level (2-B), children fully consider all 
justice claims, such as need, equality, and merit, and try to coordinate these factors for a 
given situation. Thus, for example, children may believe that it is fairest to give more to a 
harder working person because doing so promotes an atmosphere that encourages everyone to 
work harder, even while they believe that equal distribution is the fairest allocation for a 
collaborative task.  
Piaget and Damon similarly proposed age-related developmental sequences in 
children’s conceptions of fairness. Both assumed that younger children are more focused on 
the authority commands or self-interest, while older children base their justifications on more 
cognitively complex principles of justice, such as merit. 
Social Domain Approach 
 Social domain theorists proposed an alternative model aimed to understand how 
children’s understanding of the moral domain develops from an early age (Killen & Smetana, 
2015; Smetana et al., 2014; Turiel, 1983). Differing from Piaget’s argument that younger 
children have a limited ability to establish moral concepts on their own and therefore develop 
a general deference to authority, Turiel (1983) and colleagues contended that young children 
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conceptually construct different types of social knowledge (moral, societal, personal) from 
the initial stages of their development. They found that children as young as 3 to 4 years of 
age were able to distinguish moral events which pertain to others’ welfare (e.g., one should 
not steal others’ toys) from various kinds of social knowledge, such as social conventions 
(e.g., wearing school uniforms to school) and personal decisions (e.g., whom to invite for 
one’s birthday party). This perspective claims that children have the ability to harbor a moral 
concern for fairness, justice, and others’ welfare from an early age and, further, to understand 
that moral rules are absolute and unalterable (Turiel, 1983, 1998; Killen & Smetana, 2015). 
Furthermore, research based on this theory provided new findings regarding children’s 
thinking about distributive justice. Because children’s conceptions of fairness emerge from 
their own speculation of what is just from an early age, children base their fairness decisions 
on what they think is fair treatment of others, rather than abiding by norms, rules, or 
authority.  
The social domain perspective also emphasizes the importance of documenting 
children’s reasoning for their judgments. This methodology provides a more detailed 
description of how children’s distributive justice undergoes a developmental trajectory. 
Although children’s judgments may seem similar (e.g., both children think that it is fair to 
allocate more school supplies to someone who is poor than someone who is rich), children’s 
underlying reasons appear to be different (Nucci & Turiel, 2009; Turiel, 2006). For example, 
children who focus more on conventional social knowledge may highlight the norms of the 
society (e.g., it is the group’s tradition that we give more to the needy children), whereas 
others focus on fairness and justice (e.g., the poor children need the school supplies to have 
the same resources and opportunities to learn as others). Thus, in examining concepts of 
fairness, it is a priority to investigate the reasoning behind children’s decisions in a resource 
allocation context. Considering this social domain perspective, more studies are needed to 
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investigate when and how children’s considerations about moral issues take priority over 
considerations of other social knowledge, like societal and personal issues. How this concern 
develops with age is also an important aspect to be investigated further.  
In the following sections, theories discussed here - such as the social domain theory 
and Piaget’s theory - will be referenced in order to explain and interpret current empirical 
research findings, as well as to provide new directions for future study. 
Development of Children’s Fairness Allocation Decisions 
Early Understanding of Fairness: Children’s Preference for Equality 
The origin and development of children’s early understanding in fair resource 
distribution has been extensively examined from multiple theoretical perspectives. Overall, it 
has been emphasized that younger children are more likely than older children to regard equal 
distribution to be the fairest arrangement; however, over time, children’s preference for strict 
equality is tempered by a more complete consideration of equity and merit when distributing 
resources (Piaget, 1932; Damon, 1977; Rizzo & Killen, 2016). Thus, with age, children 
increasingly incorporate factors such as whether an individual needs resources more, or 
whether a person has worked harder to acquire resources in their resource allocation 
decisions. 
From a traditional developmental science perspective, Piaget (1932) and Damon 
(1977) argued that children prefer equality among recipients when distributing resources. 
That is, approximately up to around 5 years of age, children are found to abide by strict 
equality and judge such equal distributions to be fair. Interestingly, this is found to be evident 
even in situations where children’s self-interests are factored in, such as when they have 
opportunity to keep more for themselves.  
Extensive research work on the early roots of fairness understanding also illuminated 
children’s preference for equality (Olson & Spelke, 2008; Geraci & Surian, 2011; Schmidt & 
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Sommerville, 2011). This line of work documented how early children start to prioritize 
equal distribution over unequal distribution by examining participants as young as infancy 
and toddlers. For instance, toddlers’ looking times and preferences for puppets were 
examined in situations of equal or unequal distributions. Schmidt and Sommerville (2011) 
showed children two puppets who were given either equal or unequal resources and found 
that 15 months of age toddlers looked at the unequal allocations for a significantly longer 
time than the equal allocations, suggesting that they regarded such unequal distributions as 
unexpected or surprising. Further, Geraci and Surian (2011) showed that 16 months of age 
toddlers preferred a puppet who allocated the same amount of resources to recipients, thus 
demonstrating equal distribution, over ones who did not. These studies suggested that fairness 
understanding exists even in early childhood. 
In addition, researchers who focused on children’s social categorization and their 
fairness decisions provided some additional evidence for preschool children’s preference for 
equal distribution (Olson & Spelke, 2008). In a study by Olson et al. (2008), children were 
introduced to puppets that differed in terms of relationship status, such as strangers, family 
members, and friends. Although 3.5-year-old children were more likely to give resources to 
those with close relationships (family, friends) than strangers, this was only salient when the 
resources were limited. When resources were plentiful, children preferred to give them out 
equally to family members and strangers, making further implications for children’s 
preference for equal sharing.  
Converging evidence was also provided by researchers from both the comparative 
psychology perspective (Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011) and the behavioral 
economics perspective (Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; Hook & Cook, 1979). For 
example, Warneken et al. (2011) showed that children as young as 3 years of age preferred to 
share a limited number of resources with their peers even when their self-interest could drive 
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their judgment (e.g., the situation allowed them to take all the resources for themselves). 
Further, when children were faced with an unequal resource distribution between themselves 
and others, they were willing to remove an extra resource (e.g., throw the resource to a trash 
can so that equal distribution can be met) (Blake & Rand, 2010). Other studies also revealed 
that when more resources were given to benefit the self, children rejected the given unequal 
distribution (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011).  
More recently, developmental perspectives based on the social domain group theory 
emphasized, by documenting children’s allocation judgment and reasoning, that young 
children’s preference for equality is also salient when external factors (e.g., need) vary. In a 
study by Rizzo and Killen (2016), children viewed a limited number of resources and were 
asked to allocate these between two recipients, one wealthy and the other poor. Although the 
recipients’ need differed (i.e., the wealthy recipient had less need for the resources), children 
around 3 to 4 years of age preferred to distribute resources equally to both recipients, not 
reflecting the different levels of needs. In their reasoning, young children referenced the 
equal treatment of individuals (e.g., “They should get the same amount”) more than they 
referenced others’ welfare of needs (e.g., “They’ll get very sick if they don’t have any.”). 
This reflected that for children 3 to 4 years of age, the criteria for fairness judgments are 
determined based on whether people receive equal treatment, regardless of other factors such 
as need or merit.  
Concerns for Merit in Fair Resource Allocation 
 As discussed above, diverse theoretical perspectives suggest that preference for 
equality is strong from an early age (Damon 1977; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Warneken, Lohse, 
Melis, & Tomasello, 2011). However, ample research has shown that children’s conceptions 
of fairness develop from strict equality to more mature resource allocation modalities, such as 
taking one’s merit into account as their moral thinking develops (Sigelman & Waitzman, 
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1991). In other words, children come to incorporate how hard one worked, and how much 
one produced in their resource allocation decisions and learn that unequal distributions are 
justified in certain situations when merit is salient (Kienbaum & Wilkening, 2009; Rizzo et 
al., 2016; Schmidt et al., 2016). Merit is often presented as the overall contribution required 
to gain resources. In this sense, merit involves both level of effort (how hard you work) and 
level of outcome (how much you produce). The following section discusses children’s 
developing understanding of merit in resource allocation distribution with age, children’s 
incorporation of merit into allocation decisions when other factors (e.g., need) are present, 
and how their merit-based distribution changes in regards to type of resources (e.g., whether 
the resources are necessary or luxury in nature) to be allocated.  
Merit-based distribution across ages. With children’s emerging understanding of 
concerns on merit, children come to realize that strict equality is no longer the optimal 
distribution in every case. Thus, with age, children increasingly integrate how much an 
individual contributed in a given task into their resource allocation decisions. For young 
children under the age of 6 years, there are some competing arguments on when children 
come to integrate merit in their distributive judgments. While some prior studies reveal that it 
is not until 7 years of age that they fully incorporate merit in making fair allocation decisions 
(Baumard et al., 2012; Waitzman, 1991), other studies find that children as young as 3 years 
of age have the ability to recognize people who work harder, and thus judge that it is fair to 
give more resources to them (Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012; Liénard, Chevallier, Mascaro, 
Kiura, & Baumard, 2013).  
For example, one study by Melis, Altrichter, and Tomasello (2013) documented that 
young children’s distribution of resources varied as recipient effort varied. Children as young 
as 3 were introduced to a hardworking puppet who worked collaboratively on a task and to 
another free-riding puppet who expressed a preference not to collaborate. When children 
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were asked to share a limited resource (e.g., gummy bears) between the puppets and 
themselves, they were more likely to share equally with the hard-working puppet than with 
the free-riding puppet. Thus, young children were able to not only acknowledge others’ hard 
work, but to reflect this acknowledgment in their allocation decisions regarding limited 
resources.  
However, different studies suggest that it is not until 6 or 7 years of age that children 
evaluate merit as a legitimate reason to deviate from equality (Damon, 1977; Sigelman & 
Waitzman, 1991). Baumard et al. (2012) provides some insight into the developmental 
trajectory of children’s understanding of merit. In this study, children 3 to 4 years of age were 
told about two protagonists. One worked hard to bake the cookies and the other did not. To 
fully test children’s understanding of merit, children were asked in different contexts: how 
they would give out one big cookie and a small cookie (forced choice unequal distribution); 
and how children would give out 3 cookies, without initally forcing them to give all three 
cookies to the two protagonists. An interesting finding was revealed: when children were 
faced with the first forced choice question, a majority of them gave a bigger cookie to the 
hardworking person, reflecting their understanding of merit. However, when the second 
question was not framed to be a non-forced choice question, a majority of children initially 
preferred to give out equally by not giving out the third cookie to anyone. The findings 
implied that children as young as 3 to 4 years of age still prefer equal treatment; however, it 
also shows evidence for the precursor to their gradual understanding of merit. 
Similarly, children’s understanding of fairness distribution based on merit was found 
to develop dramatically in the preschool period and thus full understanding of merit was 
apparent around 8 years of age (Schmidt, Svetlova, Johe, and Tomasello., 2016). This study 
by Schmidt et al. (2016) examined 3-, 5- and 8-year-olds to examine how children integrate 
merit into their resource allocation judgments. In this study, children were shown two 
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puppets: one neutral puppet that did not provide any reason on why she should receive more 
resources, and another puppet that claimed why she should get more resources based on 
merit. Merit was reflected effort, such as “[target puppet] cleaned up the room”. The findings 
revealed that 3-year-olds displayed a strong preference for equality between the neutral 
puppet and the puppet with a reason, although they were given justification for one puppet to 
receive more resources. However, such preference for strict equality diminished dramatically 
between 3 and 5 years of age, reflecting children’s increasing ability to consider why one 
puppet deserves more than another. Particularly between the ages of 5 to 8 years, children 
were more likely to give more to the meritorious puppet as they increasingly considered merit 
to be a justified reason to deviate from equality.  
In addition, this study further examined whether children are able to differentiate 
reason based on merit from reasons based on egocentric demand (e.g., I just want more). 
Thus, children were asked to allocate resources between the neutral puppet and another 
puppet with egocentric demand. Up to 5 years of age, children indiscriminately favored the 
meritorious puppet and egocentric puppet over the neutral puppet, thereby giving more to the 
puppet who provided any reasoning. However, an interesting developmental change between 
5 to 8 years of age showed that children’s acceptance of egocentric reasons did not increase, 
thereby not giving more to a puppet just because she wants more. This is unlike their 
increasing acceptance of legitimate reason based on merit. The findings suggested that 
children develop a more profound understanding of distributive justice as they age, allowing 
them to move from observing strict equality to deviating from equality for any given reason, 
and then finally to deviating from equality for legitimate reasons, such as merit.  
Merit-based distribution in morally complex situations. Not only do children 
acknowledge merit in a straightforward context where one works hard and the other does not, 
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but children are also found to integrate merit in complex situations, such as when other 
factors (e.g., needs) are embedded in merit.  
Kienbaum and Wilkening (2009) examined principles that children and adolescents of 
6, 9, and 15 years of age rely on when distributing resources to others. All children were 
introduced to recipients who varied in terms of effort in cleaning a schoolyard and in terms of 
need for resources (i.e., candies). Then, the children were examined by which factors they 
relied upon more in their fair allocation judgments. For example, children heard that the first 
protagonist had collected a small (or medium, or big) amount of garbage, whereas the second 
protagonist hadn’t collected any garbage, thereby differing the level of effort. However, the 
second protagonist was described to have more (or less, or as much) candies as compared to 
the first protagonist, in order to vary the comparative level of needs. Then, children were 
asked to distribute candies in a way that they think is the fairest way. As expected based on 
previous literature, even the youngest children (6 years) rarely relied on strict equality and 
were old enough to understand that certain principles legitimately justify deviations from 
equality. Interestingly, this study revealed the principles that children most valued at each 
developmental stage: the youngest children in primary school (6 years) mainly focused on 
recipient’s needs and allocated resources mainly based on who had less at home, rather than 
considering who worked harder to clean up. However, children aged 9 years and 15 years 
showed evidence that they increasingly considered both effort and need as primary allocation 
principles, thereby integrating two factors into their allocation judgments. For example, 
adolescents were much more likely than younger children to judge that the high effort/low 
need person deserved more than low effort/low need, whereas younger children judged that 
the high need person deserved more than low need person, regardless of the level of effort. 
This age-related pattern revealed that children’s judgments concerning fairness and justice 
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emerge from an earlier understanding of needs throughout preschool age, and then further 
start to integrate effort more as they enter middle to late childhood.   
Similarly, Sigelman and Waitzman (1991) illuminated the developmental trajectories 
of children’s use of merit by investigating from childhood through early adolescence - 5 to 13 
years of age (divided into 5, 9, and 13 years of age) - when other additional factors such as 
needs and age status are varied. This study departed from previous studies in that it 
manipulated not only recipients’ effort and need, but also the situational contexts (e.g., in 
which situations children made the decisions). Children were presented with three characters: 
one character who was more productive and thus made more paintings, pots, etc. than the 
others (“merit”), one character who was poor and needed more clothes, money, etc. than the 
others (“need”), and one character who was older than the others (“age”). Then, children 
were asked to allocate 9 resources (e.g., ballot, money) in two different situational contexts: 
1) voting and 2) charity. For the voting scenario, recipients had the privilege to vote for their 
favorite game per ballot received and thus, they had more votes if they received more 
resources. For charity scenarios, recipients were given money, which they could spend to buy 
things they needed such as socks, and thus they had more money to use if they received more 
resources. The findings revealed that the youngest group of 5 years was more likely to 
distribute equally regardless of the different moral claims of merit and need, revealing that 
children at this age are still insensitive to principles of distributive justice. With age, 
however, older children of 9 and 13 years of age were able to incorporate both factors of 
merit and need into their judgments and further, tailored their decisions to the situational 
context. That is, older children allocated more resources to meritorious recipients in a 
“voting” context in which hard work was emphasized, whereas children preferred to allocate 
more resources to the needy recipient in the “charity” context in which need is emphasized. 
These findings add to the current literature in demonstrating that children not only integrate 
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diverse sets of legitimate principles in fairness decisions, but they also develop the ability to 
consider situational contexts in which they make judgments. 
Merit-based distribution and type of resources. Most previous studies on 
children’s reliance on merit in resource allocation have paid little attention to the type of 
resource. That is, most studies invite children to allocate simple toy-like resources, such as 
stickers and gummy bears. However, a recent study by Rizzo, Elenbaas, Cooley, and Killen 
(2016) did manipulate resource type, with resources either introduced as necessary (e.g., 
something needed to avoid harm, such as medicine) or as a luxury (e.g., something enjoyable 
to have, such as toys) with the aim of determining whether this difference would influence 
children’s reliance on merit in allocation decisions. Two groups of children, ages 3 to 5 and 
age 6 to 8, were introduced to a situation in which merit was varied: one character applied 
greater effort (e.g., someone works really hard looking for resources and finds a lot of 
resources) and another character applied no effort (e.g., another person is lazy and does not 
work to find any resources). When children were asked to allocate resources between the two 
characters, an interesting age-related change emerged with regard to resource type. The older 
children allocated more of the luxury resource to the hardworking character than the younger 
children, showing a more mature understanding of merit in allocation decisions. On the other 
hand, older children were more likely to distribute the necessary resource more equally in 
comparison to the younger children. This reflected that although older children had a better 
ability to integrate effort into their allocation decisions they were, at the same time, also more 
likely to raise concerns for others’ welfare by considering the nature of resources divided. 
That is, for necessary resources like food and medicine, older children judged that effort 
should receive less consideration because such resources are essential for welfare, whereas 
luxury resources were allocated primarily by merit. This study demonstrated that children 
consider effort in resource allocation, but their consideration of effort can vary depending on 
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resource type.  
   While extensive research have focused on children’s understanding of merit in 
resource allocation context, the review of empirical studies showed that almost none of the 
previous studies have delineated how exactly children define merit in distributing resources. 
In other words, not much is shown how and whether children disentangle effort from 
production and how this is related to their fairness judgments in resource allocation. This 
brings a further question such as, do children view merit as based on how hard one works or 
how much one produces? Thus, more investigation is warranted to fully examine children’s 
fairness principle concerning merit, which will be discussed more in the future directions 
section. In the next section, research on children’s views about authority distributions based 
on diverse moral concerns will be reviewed.  
Children’s Views about the Moral Basis for Allocating Resources by Authority  
Despite the extensive literature on children’s conceptions of authority and authority 
jurisdiction in moral contexts (see Laupa, 1995; Laupa, & Tse, 2005; Laupa, Turiel, & 
Cowan, 1995), little research has been conducted on how children conceptualize what 
principles individuals in positions of authority (such as teachers and parents) rely on when 
allocating resources. This raises several questions: what moral principles do children expect 
individuals in positions of authority to focus on? Do they expect that authority members to 
rely on equality or equity like merit? When considering merit, do children view authority 
members as focusing on effort, production, or another merit-based dimension? Whether 
children’s resource distribution would be reconciled when they face authority’s unfair (e.g., 
non-meritorious) allocation decisions is an important area of investigation. Though still 
limited, growing bodies of work have investigated these concerns in a resource allocation 
context.  
Children’s Expectations of Authority’ Fair Resource Distribution  
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Although a few, some studies have revealed that children expect authorities to 
integrate diverse moral concerns rather than abiding to strict equality when allocating a 
limited number of resources (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016; Elenbaas, Rizzo, Cooley, & Killen, 
2016; Li, Rizzo, Burkholder, & Killen, 2016). For example, a study by Elenbaas, Rizzo, 
Cooley, and Killen (2016) asked children how an authority member (e.g., someone in charge 
of a city) should give out a limited number of school supplies to two different schools: a 
wealthy school (e.g., already has lots of supplies) and a less wealthy school (e.g., has a lack 
of supplies). In order to track the developmental change, two different age groups of 5 to 6 
years and 10 to 11 years were examined. The findings revealed that children expected the 
authority to recognize the need for supplies in the disadvantaged school and distribute 
resources accordingly. That is, city authorities were expected to give more school supplies to 
the less wealthy school than to the wealthy school. In addition, children’s acceptability 
judgment (“okay or not okay”) of the authority’s hypothetical resource allocation was 
documented. Thus, children were asked, “What if the person in charge of the city gave more 
boxes to this school because they always got less before? How okay or not okay would that 
be?” Here, 70% of children across all ages positively evaluated the authority’s decision to 
give more supplies to a disadvantaged school. In their reasoning for the judgments, an age-
related change was found: older children raised issues of Past Inequality (e.g., “They - the 
less wealthy school - didn’t have more before”) more than younger children.  
Another study by Li et al. (2016) investigated children’s acceptability judgment 
(“How okay or not okay?”) about a teacher’s allocation decision to determine how children 
evaluate decisions that reflect equality or inequality. In this study, children were presented 
with an authority figure in the form of a classroom teacher who had two juice boxes to 
allocate between two students. One student (A) did not have any juice box in his bag and the 
other student (B) already had two juice boxes in his bag, but was not aware of the fact; thus, 
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both students thought they did not have any juice boxes. Three conditions were presented to 
children: 1) teacher gives two juice boxes to A and no juice box to B (unequal allocation in 
the teacher’s viewpoint which resulted in positive equitable allocation), 2) teacher gives no 
juice box to A and two juice boxes to B (unequal allocation in the teacher’s viewpoint which 
resulted in negative inequitable allocation), and 3) teacher gives one juice box to A and one 
juice box to B (equal allocation in the teacher’s viewpoint which resulted in negative 
equitable allocation). Findings revealed that children expected the authority to make 
decisions based on what they thought would be the fair resource allocation, thereby giving 
the same amount to both. That is, regardless of consequences, after integrating the 
perspective and given knowledge of the teacher, children evaluated equal allocation by the 
teacher (giving 1 to each student) to be more acceptable than other conditions when the 
teacher gave out unequally. This was prominent even when ways to distribute by the teacher 
resulted in rectifying hidden preexisting inequality. The findings revealed that in the resource 
allocation context, children not only consider multiple moral concerns like need and merit, 
but they also integrate the perspective of the allocator in their resource allocation judgments, 
reflecting their mature understanding of fairness principles.  
 Although several studies have highlighted what moral principles children expect 
individuals in positions of authority to focus on, these have been limited to situations where 
the levels of need were different (i.e., preexisting inequality). Few studies have explored 
resources distribution contexts when merit is integrated. Thus, future investigations on how 
children would expect the authorities to make fairness decisions are warranted, particularly 
when it relates to children’s merit-based allocation decisions.  
Children’s Resource Distribution with regards to Authorities’ Non-meritorious 
Distributive Decisions  
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Children’s in-depth understanding of a moral principle can be examined by 
documenting how children’s resource distribution would be reconciled when they face 
authority’s unfair (e.g., non-meritorious) allocation decision. That is, how do children 
evaluate an authority figure’s decision to allocate resources in a way that is potentially 
unfair? This examines what children would do when they face rules or authority claims that 
are not in line with their fairness principles. For example, authority figures could provide 
suggestions that result in an unfair distribution, such as giving more to a person who has 
applied less effort (e.g., lazy worker), or already has more (e.g., wealthy school).  
Different perspectives suggest different views on this: traditional developmental 
theorists such as Piaget (1932) would suggest that young children before ages 7 to 8 years are 
likely to accept authority’s unfair decision based on the child’s early unilateral respect for 
authority. After that stage, children are found to make fairness decisions stemming from their 
own moral principles. By contrast, more recent studies have revealed that children as young 
as 4 years of age have the ability to make allocation decisions based on what they believe is 
fair, and reject authority commands that seem unfair and unjust, such as giving less to a 
harder-working recipient (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016; Elenbaas, Rizzo, Cooley, & Killen, 2016; 
Li, Rizzo, Burkholder, & Killen., 2016).  
For example, a study by Elenbaas et al. (2016) found that children consider 
authority’s unfair distribution to be unacceptable. After children were presented with two 
schools, a wealthy school (e.g., already has lots of supplies) and a less wealthy school (e.g., 
has a lack of supplies) and then viewed an authority allocate a new set of resources, an 
authority figure made a non-fair distribution such as “the person in charge of the city gave 
more boxes to this school because they always got more before”. Here, a majority of children 
(77%) evaluated this to be not acceptable. In addition, an interesting age difference revealed 
that older children (10-11 years) evaluated this more negatively than younger children (5- 6 
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years), reflecting their developing concerns for rectifying preexisting inequality. Findings 
showed that children as young as 5 years old did not abide by authorities’ decisions to 
perpetuate the unequal treatment just because the claim came from authority, but rather 
judged it to be wrong.  
Similarly, another study by Fry and Corfield (1983) examined a situation where an 
authority made decisions regarding the distribution of resources fairly or unfairly to the child 
for their hard work. In this study, a mother gave her child a fair amount of money for 
cleaning his room, which reflected fair allocation. In the other condition, the child received 
an unexpectedly unfair amount of money, which reflected unfair allocation. Findings showed 
that children 10 -11 years of age thought that it was not acceptable for the mother to give the 
child an unfair compensation for the effort, which suggests that children’s conceptions of 
fairness in resource distribution are independent from authority’s decisions and commands. 
More studies on children’s resource allocation decisions based on their own conceptions of 
fairness, and not merely on authority views, should be conducted to fill this gap in the 
literature. 
In addition, similar sets of findings on children’s rejection of wrongful commands 
have been extensively shown for general moral principles in a variety of moral contexts other 
than distributive justice, such as physical transgressions (e.g., “it is wrong to harm others”) 
and psychological transgressions (e.g., “it is wrong to call mean names to others”) (Killen 
&Smetana, 2015; Turiel, 1993, 1986; Laupa & Tse, 2005), and even more complex situations 
in which wrongful stereotypic commands are issued (“boys are not supposed to practice 
ballet”) (Park et al., 2012). In applying these general moral principles, children did not 
blindly obey authorities’ misleading commands even from an early age.  
The current study 
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This literature review outlined different perspectives on theory and research on 
children’s allocation decisions in regards to merit, along with children’s views on authority’s 
distributive decisions. Still, considerable work is needed to better understand how children 
incorporate “merit” in a resource allocation context.  
Effort-based Resource Allocation: Disentangling Effort from Outcome 
One line of research that would be fruitful to investigate is how children define merit 
and the extent to which they focus on effort (how hard one works) versus production (how 
much one produces). In general, meritorious protagonists are described in child development 
research as “hardworking and productive,” especially in contexts examining children’s 
distributive justice decisions. What is not known is the bigger concern of whether it is the 
effort itself or the productivity of the hard work that drives children’s fairness decisions 
regarding resource allocation. It could be that children primarily value the intentional aspect 
of actors—how hard one works on a given task—regardless of the outcome. In that case, they 
would regard effort alone as the legitimate reason to deviate from equality. However, it could 
also be that children focus on the outcome—how productive the actor has been in a given 
task—regardless of their level of effort. Further, there would also be some instances when 
these two factors are in conflict, effort versus outcome; that is, when one is hardworking but 
not productive or one is lazy but productive. Little is known about which aspect or merit – 
effort or outcome - children would prioritize in their fairness decisions and how it varies with 
age.  
This focus is relevant for Piaget’s (1932) research on children’s developmental 
trajectories for weighing intentions and outcomes. Piaget (1932) asserted that children first 
focus on the outcomes at an early age and then gradually come to consider intentions at a 
later age. For example, upon comparing children’s evaluation on ill-intentioned 
transgressions (e.g., a boy was being naughty and broke one cup) versus accidental 
- 37 - 
 
 
transgressions (a boy unknowingly broke 10 cups), Piaget suggested some developmental 
trajectory that younger children are more driven by the consequences of actions, thereby 
judging accidental transgressions as more unacceptable. Piaget’s argument was not 
exclusively theoretical: Some later studies (Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, & Farnill, 1973; 
Imamog˘lu, 1975; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996) supported his claims in demonstrating that 
although children 5 to 8 years of age had the ability to take intention into account, their 
consideration of intentions was primarily based on the outcomes of actions. Additionally, an 
empirical study by Helwig, Zelazo, and Wilson (2001) also revealed some age related 
findings for 3, 5, and 7 years in children’s judgments of psychological harm and their 
assignment of punishment when intentions and outcome were varied. When children were 
shown an actor having a positive or negative intention to give a friend an exotic animal as a 
gift, children’s overall judgment concerning the acceptability of actions was primarily and 
exclusively based on the outcome, namely the friend's reaction. That is, 3 to 7 years judged 
the act as wrong when it resulted in a negative psychological reaction (e.g., fear, 
embarrassment), regardless of the actor’s intentions. However, age differences emerged in 
punishment assignment decisions: younger children tended to focus on outcome, whereas 
older children tended to focus on intentions, implying that some developing shifts are 
underway. 
In short, current empirical studies strongly suggest that children’s strong reliance on 
outcome continue to decrease with age throughout childhood as they develop a more mature 
understanding of others’ intentions. While many studies have investigated such children’s 
integration of intentions and outcomes in their evaluations of moral events, typically physical 
harm or destruction of property, very few have done so regarding children’s resource 
allocation decisions. Therefore, the current study aimed to disentangle effort and outcome 
and further examine how children incorporate effort (positive intent) and outcome (positive 
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consequences) in their decisions regarding fair resource distribution and how these fairness 
decisions develop with age.  
Conclusions 
This literature review has examined the origins and development of children’s 
conceptions of fairness and their resource allocation decisions. In particular, the literature has 
emphasized children’s developing understanding of merit in the resource allocation context 
(Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevallier, 2012; Mascaro, Kiura, & Baumard, 2013; Rizzo, 
Elenbass, Cooley, & Killen, 2016). However, many questions still persist as to children’s 
developing moral principles of fairness, specifically with regard to merit. Most importantly, 
few studies have attempted to disentangle effort from outcome: in most of the previous 
research, merit is shown through an individual who both worked harder and produced a better 
outcome. As a result, there arises the important question of whether children’s reasoning 
underlying the decision to deviate from equality is based on the effort itself, or on the 
outcome of that effort. Further, when these two factors are in conflict, it remains unclear 


















  Participants included a total number of 100 children who were 3 to 6 year-olds 
(younger group; n = 50) and 7 to 10 year-olds (older group; n = 50). Participants were 
approximately evenly divided between males and females; 52% (n = 52) were boys and 48% 
(n = 48) were girls. The sample size was determined using power analyses in G* Power 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), given the varied analyses of interest and with the 
desire to achieve power levels of .80.  
  Children were recruited from preschools, elementary schools, and Sunday schools in 
the mid-Atlantic region of the United States serving majority middle SES. The schools 
children attended were racially/ethnically diverse, where the demographics of children are 
31% European-American, 29% Latino, 21% African-American, 14% Asian-American, and 
5% multiracial (2016 US Maryland Report Card, Montgomery County). Approximate annual 
family income for the region was 24.6% for <$50K, 35.5% for $50-100K, 20.8% for $100K-
150K, 9.3% for $150K-200K, and 9.8% for >$200K (United States Census Bureau). The 
research coordinator first reached out to the school principals and explained the details of the 
study. Once the school voluntarily agreed to participate in the study by signing the school 
consent form, parental consent forms were distributed to the parents of children 3 to 10 years 
of age attending the school. Only children with parental consent were allowed to participate 
in this study. Along with parental consent, each child’s verbal consent was obtained before 
the study begins.  
Procedure 
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 Children participated in the study in a quiet room at the schools. First, participants were 
given an introduction and full instructions before they start the study. They were asked to raise 
any questions or concerns they may have during the study and were allowed to end their 
participation at any time. Then, children responded to four hypothetical stories accompanied by 
brightly colored pictures. Following each story, participants responded to several items regarding 
children’s resource allocation decisions, children’s evaluations of teacher’s non-meritorious 
allocation decisions, children’s peer preference and children’s justifications about their 
responses. This study used a resource allocation framework, which was to give participants the 
opportunity to distribute a limited number of resources to peer recipients (i.e., six star stickers). 
Resources were given to children during resource allocation questions throughout the stories. 
The full study protocol was reviewed by the Institutional Review Board at the University of 
Maryland. See Appendix A for Institutional Review Board Approval and Consent forms. 
  The same protocol using the identical set of measures was administered to the 
younger participants (3 to 6 years-olds) and older participants (7 to 10 years-olds). However, 
due to the fact that younger children’s language abilities are too limited to fully complete the 
survey on their own, interviews were conducted for the younger children and surveys were 
administered for the older children. Thus, for the younger children, a trained researcher read 
the stories, asked questions, and wrote down the responses for children in a 1 on 1 interview 
format. The older children, on the other hand, received a packet of survey, read the stories, 
responded to the questions, and wrote down the responses on their own. Previous studies 
have revealed no difference for administration of the instrument in survey or interview format 
(Hitti, Mulvey, Rutland, Abrams, Killen, 2014). The survey for older children was 
administered in a small group – approximately less than five children per group – and a 
trained researcher was present to answer any questions children may have. Both interviews 
and surveys took about 20 – 25 minutes to complete.  




  Participants were presented with four hypothetical stories regarding peers who 
receive a packet of sunflower seeds from their school. Stories were accompanied by brightly 
colored photos and drawings. Each story had comparison of two peers whose levels of effort 
and outcome were varied. Table 1 illustrates four possible peer characters (e.g., HH reflects a 
peer with High Effort and High Outcome as first alphabet reflects level of effort and the 
second alphabet reflects level of outcome). The combinations of two peers were assigned 
differently in each story. Table 2 illustrates which peer was compared to which peer in each 
of the four stories. Out of the six possible combinations (HH vs. LL; HL vs LL; LH vs. LL; 
HL vs. LH; HH vs. LH; HH vs. HL), only four combinations were used as two of them were 
redundant. Details of the each story are as follows. 
  Children’s understanding of merit: when effort and outcome are confounded 
(baseline). Story 1 served as a baseline story where effort and outcome were confounded in 
merit. This story described an instance where one peer had High Effort and High Outcome 
(HH) whereas the other peer had Low Effort and Low Outcome (LL). Thus, the story 
described a situation where one peer worked very hard to grow the sunflowers (i.e., provided 
water everyday) and thus grew ten sunflowers, while the other peer did not work very hard to 
grow the sunflowers (i.e., played with the toys instead of watering the seeds) and thus ended 
up growing only two sunflowers. The full protocol for Story 1 is described below:  
“This is Chris and this is Jordan. They are children your age. Their school gave 
everyone a package of sunflower seeds so that children can grow many sunflowers. Chris and 
Jordan each planted all of their seeds in a pot. Chris worked very hard to grow plants and 
gave them water everyday. Jordan did not work hard to grow plants and did not give them 
any water. One month later, Chris grew 10 sunflowers, because she worked very hard to 
water them. Jordan only grew 2 sunflowers because she did not work hard to water them.” 
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  Children’s understanding of merit: controlling for outcome. Story 2 described 
instances where effort and outcome were no longer confounded in merit. More specifically, 
this story was designed to control for outcome in describing merit. Thus, in Story 2, only the 
level of effort was varied and the level of outcome was the same. This story described an 
instance where one peer had High Effort and Low Outcome (HL) whereas the other peer had 
Low Effort and Low Outcome (LL). Here, the level of outcome was controlled to be low. 
Thereby, the story depicted a situation where one peer worked very hard to grow the 
sunflowers but grew only two sunflowers, while the other peer did not work very hard and 
also grew two sunflowers. The full protocol for Story 2 is described below:  
“This is Sam and this is Alex. They are children your age. Their school gave 
everyone a package of sunflower seeds so that children can grow many sunflowers. Sam and 
Alex each planted all their seeds in a pot. Sam worked very hard to grow plants and gave 
them water everyday. However, Alex did not work hard and did not give them any water. One 
month later, Sam only grew 2 sunflowers, although she worked very hard to water them. Alex 
only grew 2 sunflowers because she did not work hard to water them.” 
  Children’s understanding of merit: controlling for effort. Story 3 also described 
instances where effort and outcome were no longer confounded in merit. However, this time, 
this story was designed to control for effort in describing merit. Thus, in Story 3, only the 
level of outcome was varied and the level of effort was the same. This story described an 
instance where one peer had Low Effort and High Outcome (LH) whereas the other peer had 
Low Effort and Low Outcome (LL). Here, the level of effort was controlled to be low. 
Thereby, the story depicted a situation where one peer did not work very hard to grow the 
sunflowers but grew ten sunflowers, while the other peer also did not work very hard and 
grew two sunflowers. The full protocol for Story 3 is described below:  
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“This is Taylor and this is Dana. They are children your age. Their school gave 
everyone a package of sunflower seeds so that children can grow many sunflowers. Taylor 
and Dana each planted all their seeds in a pot. Taylor did not work hard to grow plants and 
did not give them any water. Dana also did not work hard to grow plants and did not give 
them any water. One month later, Taylor grew 10 sunflowers, although she did not work hard 
to water them. Dana grew 2 sunflowers because she did not work hard to water them.” 
    Children’s understanding of merit: giving priority to effort or to outcome. Finally, 
Story 4 described an instance where there was a tension between effort and outcome. That is, 
this story described an instance where one peer had High Effort and Low Outcome (HL) 
whereas the other peer had Low Effort and High Outcome (HL). Thus, one peer worked very 
hard to grow the sunflowers but only grew two sunflowers, while the other peer did not work 
very hard but grew ten sunflowers. The full protocol for Story 4 is described below:  
  “This is Casey and this is Morgan. They are children your age. Their school gave 
everyone a package of sunflower seeds so that children can grow many sunflowers. Casey 
and Morgan each planted all their seeds in a pot. Casey worked very hard to grow plants and 
gave them water everyday. Morgan did not work hard to grow plants and did not give them 
any water. One month later, Casey only grew 2 sunflowers, although she worked very hard to 
water them. Jordan grew 10 sunflowers, although she did not work hard to water them.”  
  After hearing or reading each story, children were given six star stickers. Then, 
children were asked to distribute these to the two peers in what they believed is the fairest 
way. To ensure that there was no story order effect, story order was counter-balanced; 
approximately half of the participants received stories in the order of 4 – 3 – 2 – 1, while the 
other half of the participants received stories in the order of 1 – 2 – 3 – 4. The gender of 
protagonists in the stories was matched to the participant’s gender. The entire survey can be 
found in Appendix C.  




  Following each story, participants responded to several questions. Specifically, four 
dependent measures (within-subject) will be assessed: a) Children’s own resource allocation 
and justifications, b) Children’s preference between the Two Peers, c) Evaluation of 
Authority’s non-Meritorious Allocation Decisions only for Story 1, 2, and 3, and d) 
Evaluation of Authority’s Allocation Decision based on Effort (or Outcome) only for Story 4.   
  Children’s own resource allocation. After hearing or reading each story for all 
four stories, children were given six stars to allocate between two peers to assess children’s 
own resource allocation decisions. Children were asked the following questions: 1) “Based 
on what you just heard/read, here are six stars for you to give out. Can you show me how 
many stars [Peer 1] and [Peer 2] should each get?” and 2) “Can you tell me why you gave out 
stars like this?”, which asks the justification for their allocation decisions. These questions 
were asked for all four stories. In addition, only for Story 4 (i.e., vignette where there is a 
tension between effort and outcome), children were prompted with a follow-up question: “I 
just found one more star here! If you can give this star to [peer 1] or [peer 2], who would you 
give this to?” This was asked in order to assess which factor – effort or outcome – children 
prioritized in their allocation decisions when framed in a forced choice context.   
  Reasoning coding. The open-ended justifications were coded into four different 
categories for further analyses. The four categories from pilot data are: 1) emphasis on effort 
(e.g., I’m giving more to him because he clearly worked much harder to water the plants”), 2) 
emphasis on outcome (e.g., “He deserves more stars because he grew 10 flowers but he – the 
other peer–only grew 2 flowers”), 3) emphasis on both effort and outcome (e.g., “Although 
they grew the same number of flowers, he worked harder than him”), and 4) strict abidance 
to equality (e.g., “I will give them each 3 stars because she will be sad if she gets less”). Un-
codable responses were dropped.  
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  Categories that were used were assigned a score of 1, and those that were not were 
assigned a score of 0. Two coders blind to the hypotheses of the study completed the coding 
of open-ended reasoning responses. Interrater reliability was determined using a subset of 
20% of the data; Cohen’s κ = .86 for interrater reliability.  
 Children’s preference between the two peers. Across all four stories, children 
were asked to choose which of the two peers in the story children preferred to work with for a 
hypothetical future flower-growing task. This measure was implemented to examine whether 
children took merit into account when making a decision that relates to their self-gain (e.g., 
children earn some extra stars themselves from pairing up with a partner). Thus, children 
were asked: “Let’s say it is your turn to grow sunflowers and you have a chance to get some 
extra stars! You can ask one of these two children to grow flowers with you. Who would you 
want to grow flowers with, [peer 1] or [peer 2]?” 
  Evaluation of authority figure’s non-meritorious allocation decisions. In the 
first three stories where meritorious peer is salient (e.g., a hardworking and productive peer 
for Story 1 a hardworking peer for Story 2; and a productive peer for Story 3), children were 
asked to evaluate a teacher’s allocation decisions that did not incorporate merit into their 
allocation decisions. This measure was not administered for the last story as Story 4 did not 
have one particular meritorious peer (i.e., this story showed two competing merits). In the 
first three stories, teachers’ non-meritorious allocation decisions were shown in two different 
contexts: 1) an equal allocation, and 2) an allocation decisions against merit.  
  Equal allocation. Here, children were asked to hypothesize a situation where a 
teacher would give equal amount of resources to two peers regardless of the level of effort or 
outcome. Thus, children heard or read: “Let’s say one teacher says, “I’m going to give 3 stars 
to [peer 1] and 3 stars to [peer 2] because I always give the same amount to everyone. How 
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OK or not OK is it for her to give equal stars to two peers?” The responses were recorded on 
a 6-point scale from 1 = Really Not Okay to 6 = Really Okay.  
  Allocation against merit. Next, children were asked to hypothesize a situation 
where a teacher would give more resources to a non-meritorious peer (i.e., someone who did 
not deserve resources).  
 Thus, in Story 1, children were asked: “Let’s say one teacher says, I’m going to 
give 1 star to Chris and 5 stars to Jordan because I always give more to the one who did not 
work hard and did not grow many flowers. How OK or not OK is it for her to give more to 
Jordan?”.  
In Story 2 where outcome is controlled for, children were asked: “Let’s say one 
teacher says, I’m going to give 1 star to Sam and 5 stars to Alex because I always give more 
to the one who did not work hard. How OK or not OK is it for her to give more to Alex?”. 
In Story 3 where effort is controlled for, children were asked: “Let’s say one teacher 
says, I’m going to give 1 star to Taylor and 5 stars to Dana because I always give more to the 
one who did not grow many flowers. How OK or not OK is it for her to give more to Dana?”. 
All responses were recorded on a 6-point scale from 1 = Really Not Okay to 6 = Really Okay.  
 Evaluation of authority’s allocation decision based on effort (or outcome). In 
Story 4 where there was a tension for two components of merit, effort and outcome, children 
were asked to evaluate an authority’s allocation decision based on effort, followed by an 
authority’s allocation decision based on outcome. Thus, the first question which measured 
children’s judgment on authority’s effort-based allocation was framed as: “Let’s say one 
teacher says, “I’m going to give 5 stars to Casey and 1 star to Morgan because I always give 
more to the one who worked harder rather than the one who grew more flowers. How OK or 
not OK is it for her to give more to Casey?”. Then, the second question which measured 
children’s judgment on authority’s outcome-based allocation was framed as: “Let’s say one 
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teacher says, “I’m going to give 5 stars to Morgan and 1 star to Casey because I always give 
more to the one who grew more flowers rather than the one who worked harder. How OK or 
not OK is it for her to give more to Morgan?”. Children’s responses were recorded on a 6-
point scale from 1 = Really Not Okay to 6 = Really Okay. 
Plan of Data Analysis  
  The study used set of univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA), repeated measures 
ANOVAs, t-tests, binominal tests, and chi-square tests. Specifically, univariate ANOVAs 
were conducted to examine differences by age group in children’s allocation decisions based 
on merit; repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to examine children’s reasoning data, 
t-tests were conducted to see whether children’s resource allocation decisions deviate from 
equal allocation; binomial tests were conducted to test whether responses from two choice 
options (e.g., choosing a preferred peer for a further task) were different from the probability 
of responding by chance (50%); and a series of chi-square tests of association were conducted 

















  The following results section revealed children’s understanding of merit in the 
following contexts: a) when effort and outcome were confounded (baseline), b) when 
outcome was controlled (i.e., when the level of effort was varied), c) when effort was 
controlled (i.e., when the level of outcome was varied), and d) when given the opportunity to 
prioritize either effort or outcome. A set of measures are analyzed in all four contexts.  
Children’s understanding of merit: when effort and outcome are confounded (baseline) 
   Resource allocation decisions and justifications. Children’s allocation decisions 
with six resources were documented in Story 1 where the meritorious peer had high effort 
and high outcome (HH) (i.e., hardworking and productive) whereas the non-meritorious peer 
had low effort and low outcome (LL) (i.e., lazy and unproductive). To examine whether 
children regarded merit based on both effort and outcome as an important factor to deviate 
from equality, independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare if the number of stars 
children allocated to the meritorious peer was different from the midpoint of 3 (i.e., equal 
allocation). The findings revealed that both 3 to 6 year-olds (M = 4.08, SD = 1.35; t(49) = 
5.65, p < .001) and 7 to 10 year-olds (M = 5.08, SD = .88; t(49) = 16.77, p < .001) allocated 
more stars to the meritorious peer who worked harder and grew more flowers.  
 To examine the age difference in children’s allocation decisions, an univariate 
ANOVA was conducted with number of stars allocated to a meritorious peer as dependent 
variables and the Age Group as a fixed factor. A significant main effect of age was revealed, 
F(1, 98) = 19.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. Pair-wise comparisons showed that 7 to 10 year-olds 
were more likely to allocate more stars the meritorious peer who worked harder and grew 
more flowers than 3 to 6 year-olds (see Figure 1). 
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  To understand children’s reasoning, children’s justification responses were coded into 
four categories: Emphasis on effort, Emphasis on outcome, Emphasis on both effort and 
outcome, and preference for strict equality. Endorsement of each category (in proportions) is 
presented in Table 3. To examine whether children reasoning differed across age, a 2 (Age: 3 
to 6 year-olds, 7 to 10 year-olds) × 4 (Reasoning: Emphasis on effort, Emphasis on outcome, 
Emphasis on both effort and outcome, Preference for strict equality) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last factor was conducted. An interaction effect for Age X Reasoning was 
found, F(3, 294) = 9.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. Older children referenced the emphasis on both 
effort and outcome (M = .58, SE = .06) at significantly higher proportions than younger 
participants (M = .14, SE = .06) (p < .001). Reasoning that focused on the importance of both 
effort and outcome included: “She deserved more stars because she put more work into it and 
plus grew more flowers”, “More work and more flowers should receive more”. These 
findings revealed that older children are more likely to regard merit based on effort and 
outcome as an important and legitimate factor to deviate from equality than younger children. 
Other reasoning did not reveal any age differences. 
    Preference between the two peers. Children’s responses when they were asked to 
choose which peer they would like to work with in a future task were analyzed using a set of 
binominal tests. The findings from Story 1 revealed that a majority of 3 to 6 year-olds (80%, 
n= 40) and 7 to 10 year-olds (96%, n = 48) preferred to work with the meritorious peer who 
worked harder and grew more flowers (HH) over the non-meritorious peer who was lazy and 
did not grow more flowers (LL) (both ps < .001). To examine the age differences in 
children’s preference for a peer, a Chi-square test was conducted and revealed a significant 
difference in the responses between age groups, χ2 (1, N = 100) = 6.06, p = .014. The results 
indicated that 7 to 10 year-olds showed a stronger desire to work with the meritorious peer 
over the non-meritorious peer than 3 to 6-year-olds (see Figure 2). 
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Children’s evaluations of authority figure’s non-meritorious allocation. Another 
main interest of the proposed study was to document whether children would agree with or 
reject an authority figure’s non-meritorious resource allocation decision. Such allocation 
decisions from teachers were described to be: a) an equal allocation (i.e., thereby disregarding 
different levels of merit) and b) an allocation in opposition to meritorious allocation.  
Teachers’ allocation based on strict equality. In Story 1, children were asked how 
okay or not okay the teacher’s allocation based on strict equality was (i.e., giving the same 
amount of stars to both peers) when effort and outcome were confounded in merit. To 
investigate whether children would reject an authority’s equal allocation decision, 
independent t-tests were conducted. The findings revealed that 3 to 6 year-olds (M = 4.24, SD 
= 2.01) judged that it is okay to give equally to two peers, t(45) = 2.49, p = .017. In contrast, 
7 to 10 year-olds (M = 2.90, SD = 1.33) judged that it is not okay to give equally to two peers, 
t(47) = -3.16, p = .003. A univariate ANOVA showed that children judged a teacher’s equal 
allocation as less okay with age, F (1, 92) = 14.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .14 (see Figure 3). 
Teachers’ allocation against merit. Children were then asked how okay or not okay 
the teacher’s allocation against merit was (i.e., giving more stars to the hardworking and 
productive peer over lazy and unproductive peer) when effort and outcome were confounded 
in merit in Story 1. Independent t-tests were conducted to investigate whether children would 
reject an authority’s allocation decision against merit. The findings revealed that 3 to 6 year-
olds (M = 2.32, SD = 1.76) judged that it is not okay to give more stars to the non-meritorious 
peer who was lazy and grew less flowers, t(49) = -4.76, p < .001. Similarly, 7 to 10 year-olds 
(M = 1.30, SD = .68) judged that it is not okay to give more stars to the non-meritorious peer 
who was lazy and grew less flowers, t(49) = -22.96, p < .001. Univariate ANOVA showed 
that children judged a teacher’s non-meritorious allocation as less okay with age, F(1, 98) = 
14.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .13 (see Figure 4). 
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Children’s understanding of merit: controlling for outcome 
   Resource allocation decisions and justifications. In Story 2 where outcome was 
controlled (i.e., only the level of effort was varied between the two peers), children’s 
allocation decisions with six resources were documented. The level of outcome was 
controlled to be low. Thus, the meritorious peer had high effort and low outcome (HL) (i.e., 
hardworking and unproductive) whereas the non-meritorious peer had low effort and low 
outcome (LL) (i.e., lazy and unproductive). To examine whether children regarded merit 
based only on effort as an important factor to deviate from equality, independent t-test was 
conducted. Findings revealed that both 3 to 6 year-olds (M = 3.46, SD = 1.06; t(49) = 3.09, p 
=.003) and 7 to 10 year-olds (M = 4.34, SD = 1.02; t(49) = 9.45, p < .001) allocated more 
stars to the meritorious peer with greater effort (i.e., worked harder to grow flowers) than the 
non-meritorious peer with less effort (i.e., lazy in growing flowers) when both peers grew the 
same small number of flowers.  
To examine the age difference in children’s allocation decisions, an univariate 
ANOVA test was conducted. The findings revealed an age related change, F(1, 98) = 18.31, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .16 (see Figure 1). Specifically, pair-wise comparison indicated that 7 to 10 
year-olds were more likely to prefer the meritorious peer who worked harder than 3 to 6 year-
olds in their allocation decisions, F(1, 98) = 18.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .16 (see Figure 1). 
  To examine whether children reasoning differed across age, a 2 (Age: 3 to 6 year-
olds, 7 to 10 year-olds) × 4 (Reasoning: Emphasis on effort, Emphasis on outcome, Emphasis 
on both effort and outcome, Preference for strict equality) ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the last factor was conducted. An interaction effect for Age X Reasoning was found, F(3, 
294) = 11.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .15 which revealed age differences for all four justification 
categories. First, older children referenced emphasis on effort (M = .64, SE = .06) at 
significantly higher proportions than younger participants of 3 to 6 year-olds (M = .28, SE = 
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.07) (p < .001). Reasoning that focused on the importance of effort included: “Because it's not 
fair if the person who worked hard got less and the person who didn't work got more”, 
“Because all you have to do is try your best”. Next, younger children referenced emphasis on 
outcome (M = .36, SE = .06) at significantly higher proportions than older participants of (M 
= .12, SE = .06) (p = .005). Reasoning that focused on the importance of outcome included: 
“Because they grew an equal amount of flowers so it is fair that they receive the same”. 
Further, older children referenced emphasis on both effort and outcome (M = .24, SE = .05) at 
significantly higher proportions than younger participants (M = .02, SE = .04) (p = .001). 
Reasoning that focused on the importance of both effort and outcome included: “Sam gets 
only a little more stars because he worked harder than Alex. But at the same time, Sam got 
two, just like Alex”. Lastly, younger children referenced emphasis on strict equality (M = .12, 
SE = .03) at significantly higher proportions than older participants (M = 0, SE = .03) (p = 
.011). Examples of reasoning that focused on the strict equality: “Because if everyone gets 
equal then neither of them will be sad”. These justification revealed that older children are 
more likely to focus on effort when they reason about fairness compared to younger children, 
whereas younger children are more likely to emphasize outcome or strict equality compared 
to older children.  
   Preference between the two peers. When outcome was controlled, children’s 
responses on peer preference were analyzed using a set of binominal tests. The findings 
revealed that 3 to 6 year-olds did not prefer either peer (p = .20). However, 7 to 10 year-olds 
(98%, N = 49) preferred to work with the meritorious peer who was hardworking and 
unproductive (HL) over the non-meritorious peer who was lazy and unproductive (LL) (p < 
.001). To examine the age differences in children’s preference for a peer, a Chi-square test 
was administered and it revealed a significant age difference, χ2 (1, N = 100) = 21.76, p < 
.001. The result indicated that 7 to 10 year-olds had a greater preference to work with the 
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peer who was hardworking over the peer who did not work hard than did 3 to 6 year-olds (see 
Figure 2). 
Children’s evaluations of authority figure’s non-meritorious allocation. 
Teachers’ allocation based on strict equality. When outcome was controlled, 
children were asked how okay or not okay the teacher’s allocation based on strict equality 
was (i.e., giving the same amount of stars to both peers). To investigate whether children 
would reject an authority’s equal allocation decision, independent t-tests were conducted. The 
findings revealed that 3 to 6 year-olds (M = 4.72, SD = 1.77) judged that it is okay to give 
equally to two peers, t(45) = 4.66, p <.001. In contrast, 7 to 10 year-olds (M = 3.67, SD = 
1.48) judged that it is neither okay nor not okay to give equally to two peers, p = .43. 
Univariate ANOVA showed that children judged a teacher’s equal allocation as less okay 
with age, F (1, 90) = 9.41, p = .003, ηp2 = .10 (see Figure 3). 
Teachers’ allocation against merit. When outcome was controlled, children were 
then asked how okay or not okay the teacher’s allocation against merit was (i.e., giving more 
stars to the hardworking and unproductive peer over lazy and unproductive peer) in Story 2. 
Independent t-tests were conducted to investigate whether children would reject an 
authority’s allocation decision against merit. The findings revealed that both 3 to 6 year-olds 
(M = 2.32, SD = 1.85; t(49) = -4.52, p < .001) and 7- to- 10-year-olds (M = 1.60, SD = .73; 
t(49) = -18.44, p < .001) judged that it is not okay to give more stars to the non-meritorious 
peer who did not work hard, t(49) = -4.52, p < .001. Univariate ANOVA showed that 
children judged a teacher’s non-meritorious allocation as less okay with age, F (1, 98) = 
12.96, p = .012, ηp2 = .06 (see Figure 4).  
Children’s understanding of merit: controlling for effort  
   Resource allocation decisions and justifications. In Story 3 where only the level of 
outcome was varied (i.e., effort was controlled), children’s allocation decisions with six 
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resources were documented. The level of effort was controlled to be low. Thus, the 
meritorious peer had low effort and high outcome (LH) (i.e., lazy and productive) whereas 
the non-meritorious peer had low effort and low outcome (LL) (i.e., lazy and unproductive). 
To examine whether children regarded merit based only on outcome as an important factor to 
deviate from equality, independent t-tests was conducted. Findings showed that both 3 to 6 
year-olds (M = 3.68, SD = 1.06; t(49) = 4.54, p <.001) and 7 to 10 year-olds (M = 3.30, SD = 
.61; t (49) = 3.45, p = .001) allocated more stars to the meritorious peer with greater outcome 
(i.e., grew more flowers) when the levels of effort were the same for both peers.  
To examine the age difference in children’s allocation decisions, an Univariate 
ANOVA was conducted and revealed a significant age related finding, F(1, 98) = 4.82, p = 
.03, ηp2 = .05, which showed that 7 to 10 year-olds were less likely to prefer the meritorious 
peer who grew more flowers than 3 to 6 year-olds in their allocation decisions, when both 
peers worked the same (see Figure 1). 
  To examine whether children reasoning differed across age, a 2 (Age: 3 to 6 year-
olds, 7 to 10 year-olds) × 4 (Reasoning: Emphasis on effort, Emphasis on outcome, Emphasis 
on both effort and outcome, Preference for strict equality) ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the last factor was conducted. Older children referenced emphasis on effort (M = .64, SD = 
.07) at significantly higher proportions than younger participants (M = .28, SD = .07) (p < 
.001). Reasoning that focused on the importance of effort included: “because they both did 
not work hard”, “They didn’t work or give water so they are equal”. This reasoning 
highlighted that with age, children are better able to acknowledge the importance of effort: 
even when it was the outcome that varied between the two peers, older children were more 
likely to focus on the effort (i.e., that both peers did not work hard and thus resources should 
be allocated based on this) compared to younger children.  
- 55 - 
 
 
Preference between the two peers. Children’s responses on peer preference were 
analyzed. Binominal analyses was conducted to examine whether children preferred to work 
with the meritorious peer when effort was controlled. The findings revealed that both 3 to 6 
year-olds (76%, N = 38) and 7 to 10 year-olds (88%, N = 44) preferred to work with the 
meritorious peer who was lazy but grew more flowers (LH) over the non-meritorious peer 
who was lazy and unproductive (LL) (both ps < .001). Chi-square did not reveal a significant 
age difference (see Figure 2). 
Children’s evaluations of authority figure’s non-meritorious allocation. 
Teachers’ allocation based on strict equality. When effort was controlled, children 
were asked how okay or not okay the teacher’s allocation based on strict equality was (i.e., 
giving the same amount of stars to both peers) in Story 3. To investigate whether children 
would reject an authority’s equal allocation decision, independent t-tests were conducted. The 
findings revealed that 3 to 6-year-olds (M = 5.11, SD = 1.51) judged that it is okay to give 
equally to two peers, t(45) = 7.23, p <.001. Similarly, 7–10-year-olds (M = 4.56, SD = 1.10) 
also judged that it is okay to give equally to two peers, t(44) = 6.45, p <.001. Univariate 
ANOVA did not reveal an age difference in children’s judgment of a teacher’s equal 
allocation (p = .79) (see Figure 3). 
Teachers’ allocation against merit. When effort was controlled, children were then 
asked how okay or not okay the teacher’s allocation against merit was (i.e., giving more stars 
to the lazy and productive peer over lazy and unproductive peer) in Story 3. Independent t-
tests were conducted to investigate whether children would reject an authority’s allocation 
decision against merit. The findings revealed that both 3 to 6 year-olds (M = 2.22, SD = 1.79; 
t(49) = -5.06, p < .001) and 7 to 10 year-olds (M = 2.30, SD = 1.22; t(49) = -6.98, p < .001) 
judged that it is not okay to give more stars to the non-meritorious peer who grew less 
flowers. No significant age difference was found (p = .79) (see Figure 4).  
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Children’s understanding of merit: giving priority to effort or to outcome 
  Resource allocation decisions and justifications. In Story 4 where there was a 
tension between effort and outcome, children’s allocation decisions with six resources were 
documented. That is, this story described an instance where one peer had High Effort and 
Low Outcome (HL) whereas the other peer had Low Effort and High Outcome (HL); thus, 
two competing factors were salient. In order to examine whether children made meritorious 
allocation decisions based on effort over outcome (or outcome over effort), the independent t-
tests were conducted. The findings revealed that 3 to 6 year-olds did not deviate significantly 
from an equal allocation of stars (M = 2.98, SD = 1.46), p = .92; however, 7 to 10 year-olds 
allocated significantly more stars (M = 4.1, SD = 1.4) to the peer with greater effort (and less 
outcome) than to the peer with greater outcome (and less effort); t(42) = 5.54, p < .001.  
 To examine whether there was an age difference in children’s allocation decisions, an 
univariate ANOVA was conducted. The findings showed that 7 to 10 year-olds were more 
likely to prefer the peer who worked harder (and grew less flowers) over the peer who grew 
more flowers (and did not work as hard) than 3 to 6 year-olds, F(1, 98) = 15.25, p < .001, ηp2 
= .14 (see Figure 5). 
 To understand children’s reasoning in their own distribution of stars when effort and 
outcome had a tension and age-related predictions that older children will use more effort-
focused reasoning than younger children, a 2 (Age: 3 to 6 year-olds, 7 to 10 year-olds) × 4 
(Reasoning: Emphasis on effort, Emphasis on outcome, Emphasis on both effort and 
outcome, Preference for strict equality) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor 
was conducted. An interaction effect for Age X Reasoning was found, F(3, 294) = 8.02, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .08. Older participants referenced the emphasis on effort (M = .62, SD= .07) at 
significantly higher proportions than younger participants (M = .26, SD = .07) (p < .001). 
Reasoning that focused on the importance of effort included: “It depends on how they worked 
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and not about the number”, “Only Casey worked hard and I emphasize on their effort”. 
However, younger participants (M = .26, SD = .05) placed an emphasis on outcome (M = .08, 
SD = .05) at significantly higher proportions than older participants ages (M = .08, SD = .05) 
(p = .02). Reasoning that focused on the importance of outcome included: “He should get 
more stars because he has a lot more flowers and that is what matters”. These reasoning 
highlighted that while effort was more likely to be considered as an important and legitimate 
moral criterion in fairness decisions for older children than younger children, outcome was 
considered as a more important fairness criterion for younger children compared to the older 
children. Other reasoning did not reveal any age differences. 
  Forced-choice resource allocation decision. In addition, children were given one 
extra star to give out to either the effort-peer (i.e., HL: the peer with greater effort and less 
outcome) or the outcome-peer (i.e., LH: the peer with greater outcome and less effort) (p < 
.001). In order to examine which component of merit – effort or outcome – children would 
prioritize by giving out the additional resource, binominal analyses were conducted. The 
findings revealed that 3 to 6 year-olds did not show a significant preference for either peer 
(effort-peer: 60%, N = 30) (p = .20). However, a majority of 7 to 10 year-olds (86%, N = 43) 
gave their extra star to the effort- peer (HL) than to the outcome-peer (LH) (p < .001). This 
age-related change was supported in the Chi-square test: 7 to 10 year-olds were more likely 
to prefer the peer who worked hard (but gained less) than the peer who gained more (but 
worked less) than 3 to 6 year-olds in their allocation decisions, χ2 (1, N = 100) = 8.57, p = 
.003.   
       Preference between the two peers. To examine which peer – a peer with effort or a 
peer with outcome – children would prefer to work with on a hypothetical task, binominal 
analyses were conducted. The findings revealed that 3 to 6 year-olds did not prefer either peer 
(p = .20), while 7 to 10 year-olds (90%, N = 45) preferred to work with the effort-peer (HL) 
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(i.e., who worked harder and grew less flowers) over the outcome-peer (LH) (i.e., who grew 
more flowers and did not work hard) (p < .001). To investigate whether there is an age related 
change in children’s preference for a peer, a Chi-square test was conducted. Results revealed 
a significant age difference, indicating that 7 to 10 year-olds showed a stronger preference for 
the high effort-peer over the high outcome-peer, than did 3 to 6 year-olds, χ2 (1, N = 100) = 
12.00, p = .001 (see Figure 6). 
  Children’s evaluations of authority figure’s allocation. Lastly, children’s 
acceptability responses were documented regarding an authority figures’ allocation preferring 
effort, followed by an authority figures’ allocation preferring outcome.  
Children’s evaluations of authority figure’s effort-based allocation. First, teacher’s 
allocation based on effort over outcome was introduced. Here, in order to examine whether 
children judged the teacher’s allocation decision preferring effort to be acceptable, the 
independent t-tests were conducted. The findings revealed that 3- to 6-year-olds (M = 3.62, 
SD = 2.16) judged it was neither good nor bad for a teacher to give more stars to the 
hardworking peer (who grew less flowers) over the peer who grew more flowers (but did not 
work hard) (p = .71). However, 7- to 10-year-olds (M = 4.24, SD = 1.35) judged that it was 
okay to give more stars to the hardworking peer (who grew less flowers) than the peer who 
grew more flowers (but did not work hard), t(44) = 3.70, p < .001. Though, Univariate 
ANOVA did not show any significant age difference (p = 1.00) (see Figure 7). 
Children’s evaluations of authority figure’s outcome-based allocation. Next, 
teacher’s allocation based on outcome over effort was introduced. Here, in order to examine 
whether children judged the teacher’s allocation decision preferring outcome to be 
acceptable, the independent t-tests were conducted. The findings revealed that 3- to 6-year-
olds (M = 2.58, SD = 1.91) judged that it is not okay to give more stars to the peer who grew 
more flowers (but did not work as hard) than the hardworking peer (who grew less flowers), 
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t(49) = -3.41, p = .001. 7- to 10-year-old s (M = 1.96, SD = .96) also judged that it is not okay 
to give more stars to the peer who grew more flowers (but did not work as hard) over the 
hardworking peer (who grew less flowers), t(49) = -11.28, p < .001. To examine the age 
difference in children’s acceptability judgment, an univariate ANOVA was conducted. The 
findings showed that children judged a teacher’s allocation based on outcome over effort as 

























The current study investigated children’s understanding of two important 
components that contribute to decisions regarding the fair allocation of resources: effort (how 
hard one works) and outcome (how much one produces). Previous research on children’s 
understanding of merit has shown that, with age, children increasingly regard merit as a 
legitimate reason to deviate from strict equality when allocating resources (Baumard et al., 
2012; Hamann, Bender, & Tomasello, 2014; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012). One limitation 
of previous research on this topic, however, is that many studies confound one’s effort 
towards accomplishing a goal with the outcomes associated with the goal. Yet, the relation 
between effort (how hard one works) and outcomes (how much one produces) is not always 
correlated. As an illustration, one can be lazy but have a high amount of product due to a 
windfall or an accident. At the same time, one can work hard and have a low amount of 
produce due to an unlucky circumstance. One goal of the current project was to disentangle 
these two central aspects of decisions regarding the fair allocation of resources.  
 To examine this goal, multiple measures of children’s evaluations and reasoning 
were administered including children’s own meritorious allocation decisions, children’s 
preference for a meritorious peer in a hypothetical future task, and children’s evaluations of 
teacher’s allocation decisions. The novel findings from the current study revealed that, with 
age, children gave priority to one’s effort (hard-working) over the outcome (how much was 
produced) when incorporating merit into their fairness decisions. That is, as their conceptions 
of fairness develop, children were more likely to judge that a person who gave greater effort 
should receive more resources than a person with a greater outcome. Further, even when 
effort and outcome were controlled, children still incorporated merit into their fairness 
allocation decisions.   
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In addition, in line with previous research (Laupa, Turiel, & Cowan, 1995; Turiel, 
1983;1998), children across multiple ages maintained these fairness decisions regardless of 
authority endorsement of an unfair treatment, if the authority message was directly opposite 
to merit. That is, children as young as three years of age actively rejected authority figures’ 
allocation decisions if they were against merit (e.g., giving more to the less hardworking peer 
over the hardworking peer). However, children’s fairness decisions independent of authority 
messages were not salinet when authority advcated an equal treatment to all. That is, when 
authority figures allocated resources equally by disregarding different levels of effort and 
outcome, younger children agreed with the authority’s decision, while older children did not. 
This showed that young children had somewhat limited ability to understand merit under the 
influence of an authority whereas older children’s decisions were apart from authority 
figures’ input. The main findings are discussed below in greater detail. 
Children’s Understanding of Merit: Giving Priority to Effort or to Outcome 
  A central question for the research project was whether and how children would 
evaluate (and allocate) resources when there was a tension between effort and outcome in the 
last scenario. For example, when one target character had high effort with low outcome (e.g., 
hardworking but had few flowers) and another target character had low effort with high 
outcome (e.g., lazy but had lots of flowers), younger children’s distribution decisions were 
not different from an equal allocation, revealing their competing concerns for effort and 
outcome. This finding suggested that younger children preferred to give the same amount of 
resources to a hard-working peer and to a productive peer rather than prioritizing one over the 
other. In addition, when children were introduced to a force-choice question where they could 
give one extra resource to one of the two peers, younger children did not prioritize either 
peer. Similarly, when younger children were asked to choose a peer for a hypothetical task to 
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earn extra stars, children were split between choosing the hardworking peer and the 
productive peer.  
These findings suggested that younger children experience difficulty in weighing one 
component of merit over another when effort and outcome are both salient. Such children’s 
competing concerns for effort and outcome were also shown in children’s evaluations of an 
authority’s allocation decision: when a teacher allocated more stars to the more hardworking 
(and less productive) peer, children judged that this is neither okay nor not okay. However, 
although children seemed to be uncertain about which principle should take priority in their 
decisions concerning distributive justice, one dimension of young children’s preference for 
effort was revealed: when a teacher allocated more stars to the more productive (and less 
hardworking) peer, children judged that this was not okay, indicating their disinclination 
towards an authority giving credit to productivity over effort. These findings on young 
children altogether indicated that when effort and outcome are contrasted, 3 to 6 year-olds 
overall showed strong competing concerns for both effort and outcome, with a slight sign of 
preference for effort in some limited contexts. 
However, a significantly different finding was revealed for the older children, 
indicating a developmental shift in weighing effort and outcome. Older children showed a 
strong preference for a peer with higher effort and a lower outcome (i.e., hardworking but had 
few flowers) over a peer with a higher outcome and a lower effort (lazy but had lots of 
flowers). This was supported in a diverse set of measures: older children allocated more 
resources to a hardworking peer than a productive peer in their own allocation decisions, 
judged an authority’s allocation that prioritized the hardworking peer as positive, judged an 
authority’s allocation that prioritized the productive peer as negative, and preferred to work 
with a hardworking peer over a productive peer in a hypothetical task. Further, when children 
were introduced to a force-choice question where they could give one extra resource to one of 
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the two peers, a majority of older children (86%) judged that a hardworking peer deserved 
resources more than the productive peer, unlike younger children who did not prioritize either 
peer. 
This implied that when older children made evaluations on the same situation where 
there were two competing components of merit, older children prioritized the positive 
intentional aspects of an act rather than the positive consequences as a given result. This set 
of findings reflected that, as children’s conceptions of fairness develop with age, children 
gain better understanding of which component of merit they value in a school-related 
learning context. 
Children’s reasoning for their allocation decisions also supported children’s 
increasing awareness of concerns for merit. Older children put emphasis on effort at 
significantly higher proportions than younger children and gave justifications such as “only 
she worked hard and I emphasize on the effort”. However, younger children put emphasis on 
outcome at significantly higher proportions than older children and gave justifications such as 
“he has a lot more flowers and that is what matters”. Older children regarded effort as a 
critical criterion for making fairness decisions more so than productivity and considered 
effort a legitimate reason to deviate from equality more so than younger children.  
These findings on children’s distribution decisions and justifications showed which 
components of merit children valued more in the context of school-related learning activities, 
such as the flower growing task used in the study. Older children’s preference for effort over 
outcome could be explained through children’s developing acknowledgment of intentions 
with age (e.g. Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Piaget, 1932; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996) 
along with their increasing social-cognitive abilities, such as the competence to coordinate 
competing forms of moral reasoning (i.e., hardworking but less productive) (see Killen & 
Rutland, 2011). Unveiling the age trend in children’s consideration of merit is an important 
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contribution to the current literature on children’s understanding of fairness. As noted earlier, 
most of previous research often introduced a meritorious peer as both hardworking and 
productive (e.g. Baumard et al., 2012; Blake, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014; Hamann, 
Bender, & Tomasello, 2014; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012). In the real world, this is not 
always the case: hard-working peers sometimes fail to produce good results, while lazy peers 
turn out to be highly productive due to diverse factors other than effort, such as luck and 
other situational factors. The current study was novel in that it captured this real — but 
understudied — aspect of the world. Importantly, examining children’s increasing preference 
for effort over outcome had a great contribution to the existing literature, as this information 
revealed the developmental trajectories of children’s notions of, and ideas about, the concept 
of distributive justice.   
In addition, although young children failed to prioritize effort over outcome in their 
fairness decisions, it is worthwhile to note that young children did recognize the importance 
of both effort and outcome at the same time. While researchers like Piaget (1932) and many 
other empirical studies (Feinfield, Lee, Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1999; Helwig, et al., 2001; 
Powell, Derbyshire, & Guttentag., 2012) suggested that young children made judgments 
primarily based on outcome and disregarded intentions, the current study revealed that 
younger children understood both intentions and outcomes and acknowledged importance for 
both values. In fact, some previous studies highlighted that children start to have some ability 
to pinpoint the importance of intentions from an early age (Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & 
Carey, 2013; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011) along with their 
focus on consequences. Reflecting this line of literature, when given the opportunity to 
prioritize either intention or outcome, young children placed emphasis on both effort and 
outcome.   
Children’s Understanding of Merit: Controlling for Effort and Outcome  
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 Another central goal of this study was to unveil whether children were able to 
perform meritorious distribution when effort was controlled and when outcome was 
controlled. The findings revealed that when outcome was controlled (i.e., one peer worked 
hard and the other peer did not work hard, while both peers got the same result), children 
judged that the hardworking person deserved more resoures than the lazy person, even though 
both had the same low level of outcome (i.e., small number of flowers). Similarly, when 
effort was controlled (i.e., one person produced a lot and the other person did not produce a 
lot, but they worked equally hard), children also made allocation judgments in such a way 
that the productive person should receive more resoures than the non-productive person, even 
though both peers had the same low level of effort (i.e., lazy).  
These findings suggested that children were able to incorporate merit in their fairness 
decisions even when the two components of merit were separated. Thus, effort alone (or 
outcome alone) was found to be sufficient enough for children to reach meritorious decisions. 
This finding reflected that children regarded effort and outcome separately as two important 
moral principles for fairness judgments. Particularly, because there was an even number of 
resourecs (six stars) for children to give out in this study, children could have distributed 
resources equally to two recipients if they considered that both components of merit were 
necessary to make a meritorious allocation decision. However, despite this opportunity for 
equal allocation, children still actively made meritorious allocation decisions, providing 
evidence that one of the component of merit was sufficient to intergrate merit in their fariness 
decisions. Children’s meritorious decision when equal allocation is a possibility also supports 
the fact that children’s consideration or merit stemmed from their full understanding of merit 
and concern for fairness, and not from a pressure to side with one or the other. The current 
study’s findings further extended prior work which showed that children younger than the 
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age of 6 years make equitable distribution only when there is no option for equal distribution 
(Baumard et al., 2012).  
The study also revealed interesting age-related findings. When outcome was 
controlled (i.e., effort was varied), older children (7 to 10 year-olds) were more likely to 
favor the hardworking peer than were younger children (3 to 6 year-olds). Thus, even though 
two peers grew the same small number of flowers, older children were more likely to credit 
the peer who tried hard to grow flowers than the peer who were lazy in growing flowers. This 
indicated that as children’s moral thinking develops with age, children progressively 
incorporate the intentional aspect behind an act into their moral evaluation (e.g., the good 
intention to engage in a flower-growing task) and thereby come to better appreciate one’s 
effort, apart from the outcomes of the effort. This was consistent with previous work which 
emphasized children’s increasing ability to understand intentions in their judgments and 
evaluations (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006; Zelazo, 
Helwig, & Lau, 1996).  
However, when effort was controlled (i.e., outcome was varied), the opposite age 
pattern was found as predicted. In this scenario, one peer grew lots of flowers while the other 
peer only grew a few flowers and importantly, both peers did not work hard. Thus, children’s 
allocation decisions reflected whether children made a connection between productivity and 
deservingness (i.e., a productive peer deserves more resources than an unproductive peer 
even though both peers were lazy). Reflecting older children’s stronger emphasis on 
intentional aspect, findings from this study revealed that the older children were less likely to 
favor the productive character in their allocation decisions than were the younger children. 
This could also be explained by the prior work that young children are more driven by the 
consequences than older children and thus are more likely to use consequences of actions in 
making moral evaluations (Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, & Farnill, 1973).  
- 67 - 
 
 
 Children’s reasoning regarding their allocation decisions also supported the age-
related findings above. When children were asked why they allocated resources in that way, 
older children referenced effort more than the younger children in their justifications. They 
gave explanations such as “it is fair that one gets more if one tried a lot although they grew 
the same number of flowers” (referencing effort when only effort varied) and “I give them 
equal because they both did not give water… number of flowers are different but still no one 
gave water” (referencing effort when only outcome varied). In contrast, younger children 
referenced outcome more than older children in their justifications. Thus, younger children 
were giving reasons such as, “I gave out the same stars for both because they grew an equal 
amount of flowers” (referencing outcome when only effort varied) and “she deserves more 
because she grew a lot more flowers!” (referencing outcome when only outcome varied). It 
could be that because young children have a limited ability to establish a full understanding 
of intentions, they have come to prioritize what is visualized (i.e., outcome, which in this 
study were number of flowers), unlike older children, who have more flexible moral 
reasoning (Piaget, 1932). Further, consistent with previous studies that younger children 
prefer equality when distributing the resources (Damon, 1975, 1980; Enright & Sutterfield, 
1980; Kohlberg, 1969; McGillicuddy-de Lisi, et al., 1994; Nelson & Dweck, 1977), younger 
children in this study were more likely to reference the importance of equality in their 
reasoning than were older children, offering justifications such as “I will give everyone the 
same and neither of them will be sad.”  
 As previous studies have noted, children’s fairness decisions vary depending on how 
the task is related to concerns for the self (Moore, 2009; Thompson, Barresi, & Moore, 1997). 
Thus in this study, children’s understanding of merit was also documented when their self-
interest was at stake to fully capture children’s conceptions of fairness regarding merit. When 
children were asked to choose a peer to collaborate with them for a hypothetical future task 
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(which was described as resulting in some extra stars for participants themselves), children’s 
peer preferences were parallel to their own resource allocation decisions. Specifically, 
children across age groups preferred to work with the meritorious peer when outcome was 
controlled, and also when effort was controlled. This finding revealed that children’s 
understanding of merit was salient not only when children were engaged in third party 
distribution, but also when self-interest was a factor in their decisions.  
Children’s Understanding of Merit: When effort and outcome are confounded 
As a baseline, this study investigated children’s understanding of merit in the context 
of resource allocation when effort and outcome were correlated (i.e., meritorious peer had 
greater effort and greater outcome, where non-meritorious peer had less effort and less 
outcome). Findings supported the previous studies in that children understand merit from an 
early age and thus regard merit—effort and outcome combined—as a legitimate reason to 
deviate from equality (Blake, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014; Hamann, Bender, & 
Tomasello, 2014; Melis, Altrichter, & Tomasello, 2013; Rizzo, Elenbaas, Cooley, & Killen, 
2016). Not only children allocated more resources towards the meritorious peer, but they also 
chose the meritorious peer to collaborate on a future task. These findings again corroborated 
that merit is an important moral criterion for children’s fairness judgments in a distributive 
context when effort and outcome are confounded in merit.  
Children’s Evaluation of an Authority Figure’s Non-Meritorious Allocation Decisions  
Another way to investigate children’s understanding of a fairness principle regarding 
merit is to determine how they would respond to authority figures’ decisions in a resource 
allocation context. In particular, when children faced an authority figure’s unfair distribution 
decision about merit (e.g., giving more to someone who does not deserve more) or equal 
distribution decision disregarding merit (e.g., giving same amount to everyone although one 
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worked hard), would children judge such authority’s decision as unfair and reject it? Or 
would children abide by the authority figure’s decision due to the status of authority?  
The social domain theory suggest that children have the ability to distinguish issues 
on the moral domain, such as social interactions that involve violations of welfare or justice, 
from other domains like conventional domain (Turiel., 1983). Studies based on this 
theoretical perspective revealed that children view moral decisions as rule- and authority-
independent, indicating that these cannot be changed or altered due to others’ opinions or 
rules even if they come from authority figures, unlike decisions on conventional acts (Killen 
& Smetana, 2015; Smetana et al., 2014; Laupa, 1994; Laupa, Turiel, & Cowan, 1995).  
Supporting this theoretical framework, the current study revealed that when a teacher 
made a decision that was against fair distribution (i.e., allocating more resources to an peer 
who deserves less, such as someone who worked less and had less outcome), children judged 
the teacher’s decision to be unacceptable. Both younger and older children disapproved of a 
teacher’s such non-meritorious decisions. When outcome was controlled, children evaluated 
that giving more to a lazy peer than to a hardworking peer when both peers produced the 
same amount of product was not acceptable. Similarly, when effort was controlled, children 
across age also did not approve a teacher’s giving more resources to the unproductive peer 
than to the productive peer when both peers did not work hard. The same pattern was found 
when effort and outcome were confounded. This revealed an important finding that even 
younger children of 3 to 6 years of age acknowledged that an unfair treatment in a resource 
distribution context is wrong even if the authority made the judgment. 
In addition, this study also unveiled how children would respond when introduced to 
an authority figure’s equal allocation decision (i.e., authority figure allocates three stars to 
both peers, even though one of them is a meritorious peer). Would children reject a teacher’s 
equal allocation as they did when a teacher made an allocation decision against merit? Or 
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would children be influenced by teachers’ equal decision because this does not directly 
contrast merit? Interestingly, results showed that young children judged a teacher’s equal 
allocation to be acceptable even when different levels of effort and outcome were at place. 
That is, even though one peer was clearly meritorious in terms of effort and/or outcome, 
children were finding a teacher’s equal split between the two recipients as fair.  
The fact that young children advocated allocation decisions which did not take merit 
into account was unexpected. This could be partially explained by the prior work which 
showed that young children prefer an equality rule indiscriminately and it is not until 7 or 8 
years of age that they become fully able to integrate multiple moral concerns (Damon, 1977; 
Olson & Spelke, 2008; Piaget, 1932; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). This was also in line 
with what the current study revealed earlier in children’s justifications: younger children were 
more likely than older children to bring up issues on equality in their reasoning for allocation 
decisions. This finding again support the young children’s limited understanding of merit 
when an authority’s avocation for equality was present.  
However, it is noteworthy that young children did not allocate resources equally in 
their own distribution decisions, although they supported teacher’s equal allocation. Some 
studies thus far somewhat underestimated young children’s ability to consider merit and 
suggested that that it was not until 6 to 7 years of age that children started to understand merit 
(Damon, 1977; McGillicuddy-De Lisi, Daly, & Neal, 2006; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991; 
Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011). However, the current study stretched the line 
of work by unveiling that there are indeed certain circumstances that young children are 
driven to equal allocations, such as when authority’s equal decision is salient, but young 
children still have the capability to integrate merit when there is no influence of authority. 
Reflecting children’s developing understanding of merit, such strict abidance to equality 
decreased with age as their conceptions of fairness become more concrete.  
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Study Limitations and Further Directions  
This study provides an in-depth understanding of children’s willingness to integrate 
merit into their fairness decisions and how this develops with age. The current study, 
however, does include some limitations. First, only one type of resource was used in this 
study. Resources used in the current study were star stickers which children preferred to have, 
but not resources that were necessary to children’s livelihood. These resources were luxury 
resources (e.g., resource that is enjoyable to have, such as toys), rather than necessary 
resources (e.g., resource that is needed avoid harm, such as medicine, water and food) 
(Rizzo, Elenbaas, Cooley, and Killen., 2016). A study by Rizzo et al. (2016) found that 
children’s consideration of moral principles varied depending on the characteristics of the 
resources in question; children prioritized merit when allocating luxury resources more so 
than when allocating necessary resources. This was due to the fact that children had concerns 
for everyone’s welfare and their right to have access to essential resources. Thus, given that 
children consideration of merit could be dependent on the characteristics of the resources 
being allocated, further research is needed to investigate whether and how the current study’s 
findings on disentangling effort and outcome would be different when examined with 
necessary resources such as medicine, water, and food. Because the previous work on the 
type of resources and children’s understanding of merit was restricted to situations where 
effort and outcome were confounded, further study is warranted to reveal whether children’s 
understanding of effort and outcome play a different role in their fairness decisions when 
necessary rather than luxury resources are being distributed. 
In addition, this study measured effort (whether one was hardworking or lazy) by a 
very simple depiction; one target worked at a finite task (watering flowers to grow) and one 
did not (refraining from watering plants to grow). Yet, there are many other ways in which 
effort can contribute to a task that merits resources, such as solving a problem, helping others 
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in need, and so forth. Particularly, the effort could be in the form of benefiting others (e.g., 
actively helping others or engaging in a fundraiser event) rather than maximizing self-gain or 
interest (e.g., workind hard to achieve something on one’s own, as in the current study). 
Similarly, outcome was operationalized by a finite tangible product: how many flowers a peer 
grew. Other ways to explore the outcome could include intangible products (making a group 
work better) or completing a task. The myriad ways in which effort and outcome could be 
analyzed as a contributing factor for resource allocation decisions could be explored.   
To our knowledge, the current study was the first to attempt to understand how 
children think about effort and outcome respectively in their conceptions of fairness. Because 
our participants were limited to children who reside in the mid-Atlantic region of the United 
States, the next step would be to examine children from different cultural, racial, and ethnic 
backgrounds. This would help reveal whether our findings could be generalized to children 
across cultures, or whether there are some cultural differences in how children weigh effort 
and outcome in making meritorious decisions. In addition, taking the larger context into 
account, such as access to resources and disadvantaged status would be relevant for 
understanding effort and outcome variables in an allocation task (see Elenbaas & Killen, 
2016). Another fruitful direction to follow up the study is to document peer factors of 
children who make the fairness judgments and examine if these relate to children’s fairness 
decisions regarding merit. For example, it could be that independent variables such as one’s 
academic achievement, effortful control, or the overall amount of effort the person puts into 
their school work may influence how children weigh effort and outcome. Whether a peer is a 
hardworking person herself or himself could relate to how much they value effort, and further 
how much they consider this as an important moral principle.  
Conclusions 
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The current study made a significant contribution to the current literature by examining 
the process by which children integrate merit in their fairness decisions. In particular, this 
study sought to answer remaining questions regarding the unclear aspects of children’s 
meritorious allocation decisions, such as how children weigh effort and outcome in 
considering merit. Findings from the current study revealed that children regard merit as a 
core moral principle for deviating from strict equality and that this is still true when outcome 
and effort are controlled. Further, with age, children increasingly prioritized effort over 
outcome, by focusing on the positive intentions of an act rather than positive consequneces. 
This provided further insight into which aspect of merit is prioritized in children’s 
conceptions of fairness and helped us better understand how childen come to reach a moral 
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Means and Standard Deviations for Proportion of Justifications   
  Merit based on  
Effort and Outcome 
 Merit base only  
on Effort 
 Merit base only  
on Outcome 
  
Contrasted Merit   
Effort vs. Outcome 
Age Group 3-6 years 7-10 years  3-6 years 7-10 years  3-6 years 7-10 years   3-6 years 7-10 years 
Emphasis on effort .36 .30  .28 .64  .28 .64  .26 .62 
Emphasis on outcome .18 .06  .36 .12  .24 .20  .26 .08 
Emphasis on both .14 .58  .02 .24  .08 .10  .08 .18 
Strict equality .10 .02  .12 .00  .12 .02  .20 .08 
 





Figure 1. Number of resources allocated to the meritorious peer by age and merit context. 
The total number of resources is 6. Asterisks indicate cases where children significantly 
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Figure 2. Percentage of participants who preferred to work with the meritorious peer. 
Asterisks indicate cases where children significantly preferred the meritorious peer. *** p < 




















Figure 3. Children’s evaluations of authority figure’s equal allocation by age and merit 
context. The responses range from 1 – 6, representing “really not OK” to “really OK”. 
Asterisks indicate cases where children significantly differed from the midpoint. *** p < 
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Figure 4. Children’s evaluations of authority figure’s allocation in opposition to merit by age 
and merit context. The responses range from 1 – 6, representing “really not OK” to “really 
OK”. Asterisks indicate cases where children significantly differed from the midpoint. *** p 
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Figure 5. Number of resources allocated to the High Effort (and Low Outcome) peer over the 
Low Effort (and High Outcome) peer. The total number of resources is 6. Asterisks indicate 
cases where children significantly allocated more resources to the high effort peer over high 
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Figure 6. Percentage of participants who preferred to work with High Effort (and Low 
Outcome) peer over the Low Effort (and High Outcome) peer. Asterisks indicate cases where 
children significantly preferred the High Effort (and Low Outcome) peer. *** p < .001, ** p 
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Figure 7. Children’s evaluations of authority figure’s allocation to the High Effort (and Low 
Outcome) peer over the Low Effort (and High Outcome) peer. The responses range from 1 – 
6, representing “really not OK” to “really OK”. Asterisks indicate cases where children 






























Figure 8. Children’s evaluations of authority figure’s allocation to the High Outcome (and 
Low Effort) peer over the Low Outcome (and High Effort) peer. The responses range from 1 
– 6, representing “really not OK” to “really OK”. Asterisks indicate cases where children 
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